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Zusammenfassung
In der modernen Kryptographie basiert die Sicherheit der meisten beweisbar sicheren kryptographis-
chen Primitiven auf schwierigen Problemen aus der Zahlentheorie wie beispielsweise das Faktorisierungs-
und das diskrete Logarithmusproblem. Allerdings allein auf die Hartna¨ckigkeit dieser Probleme ver-
trauen scheint riskant zu sein. Im Jahr 1994 zeigte Peter Shor wie beide genannten Probleme in
polynomieller Zeit (und somit effizient) mit Hilfe von Quantencomputern gelo¨st werden ko¨nnen.
Im Gegensatz dazu, sollen kryptographischen Primitive, welche auf Probleme aus der Kodierungs-
theorie basieren, gegen Quantuncomputerangriffe resistent sein und die uns heute bekannten Angriffe
beno¨tigen exponentielle Laufzeit. Neben der Post-Quantum Sicherheit bieten Code basierte Systeme
weitere Vorteile fr die heutigen Anwendungen aufgrund ihrer hervorragenden algorithmischen Ef-
fizienz. In der Tat sind sie schneller als herko¨mmliche Kryptosysteme wie RSA, da sie nur sehr ein-
fache Operationen wie Verschiebungen und XORs beno¨tigen, anstatt den blichen teuren Berechnun-
gen ber groe Zahlen. Trotz herausstechender Effizienz leiden die meisten Code basierten Systeme von
zu groenSchlsselgren. Die Einfu¨hrung von Codes mit algebraischer Struktur wie quasi-zyklische und
quasi-dyadische Codes, half das Schlu¨sselgro¨enproblem zu berwinden, allerdings hat sich ergeben,
dass sie anfa¨llig auf algebraische Kryptoanalyse waren.
Diese Dissertation leistet einen Beitrag zur Forschung und Entwicklung von Code-basierten Kryp-
tosysteme. Insbesondere interessieren wir uns fr die Entwicklung sowie die Verbesserung der drei
wichtigen Primitive: Stromchiffren und Hash-Funktionen. Wir untersuchen die FSB Hashfunktion
und die SYND Stromchiffre und zeigen wie deutlich ihre Effizienz verbessert werden kann, whrend
die Sicherheitsreduktionen auf die gleichen NP-vollsta¨ndigen Probleme erhalten und gu¨ltig bleiben.
Unabha¨ngig von diesen Ergebnissen, adressieren und lo¨sen wir das Problem der Auswahl geeigneter
Parametern fu¨r den Goppa Code basierten McEliece Kryptosystem. Basierend auf dem Lenstra-
Verheul Modell bieten wir auch, zum ersten Mal, ein Framework, das ermo¨glicht eine Auswahl von
optimalen Parametern zu bestimmen, welche die gewu¨nschte Sicherheitsstufe in einem bestimmten
und konkreten Jahr erfu¨llt.
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Abstract
In modern cryptography, the security of the most secure cryptographic primitives is based on hard
problems coming from number theory such as the factorization and the discrete logarithm problem.
However, being mainly based on the intractability of those problems seems to be risky. In 1994, Pe-
ter Shor showed how these two problems can be solved in polynomial time using a quantum computer.
In contrast, cryptographic primitives based on problems from coding theory are believed to resist
quantum computer based attacks and the best known attacks have exponential running time. Along
with post-quantum security, code-based systems offer other advantages for present-day applications
due to their excellent algorithmic efficiency. Actually, they run faster than traditional cryptosystems
like RSA, since they only require very simple operations like shifts and XORs instead of expensive
computations over big integers. However, although efficient, most code-based schemes suffer from
considerably large key sizes. Codes with algebraic structure such as quasi-cyclic and quasi-dyadic
codes, were proposed to overcome the key size issue, but it has been shown to be insecure against
algebraic cryptanalysis.
This thesis contributes to the research and development of code-based cryptosystems. In particular,
we are interested in developing as well as improving three important primitives: stream ciphers and
hash functions. We study the FSB hash function and the SYND stream cipher and find a way to con-
siderably improve their efficiency, while maintaining the security reduction to the same NP-complete
problems.
Independently of these results, we address and solve the problem of selecting appropriate parameter
sets for the binary Goppa code-based McEliece cryptosystem. Based on the Lenstra-Verheul model,
we also provide, for the first time, a framework allowing to choose optimal parameters that offer a
desired security level in a given year.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Today cryptography is the cornerstone of information security. It is used for many applications such
as electronic commerce, e-banking, computer password, etc. It can be divided into two families:
symmetric (or private-key cryptography), and asymmetric (or public-key cryptography). In the first
case, a single key is used for both encryption and decryption. Symmetric cryptography includes many
cryptographic primitives such as stream ciphers and hash functions. In the asymmetric setting, two
different keys are required: one is the public key, used to encrypt, and the other is the private key
needed to decrypt and therefore must be kept secret.
Nowadays, many public-key systems are available; and the three most widely used are: RSA, Rabin
and ElGamal. The security of RSA is based on the intractability of the integer factorization problem.
In the Rabin system, the underlying problem is computationally equivalent to factoring. The secu-
rity of ElGamal public-key cryptosystem is related to the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem.
However, Shor [Sho94] proposed a quantum computer algorithm, which can solve these two prob-
lems in polynomial time. Therefore, all public-key cryptosystems resting on the difficulty of these
two problems could be broken by a large quantum computer. For this reason, a significant amount of
effort in the cryptographic community bas been devoted to design new cryptographic schemes which
are resistant to future quantum computer algorithms. The schemes are known as post-quantum cryp-
tographic primitives [BBD08]. Cryptosystems based on error correcting codes are one of the four
promising alternatives [BBD08] that are believed to possess the potential to achieve this goal. In these
systems, the problem that is used is drawn from coding theory, namely the problem of decoding gen-
eral linear codes, which is known to be NP-hard [BMvT78]. The oldest-known schemes belonging to
this group are the McEliece public-key system [McE78] and its dual Niederreiter’s variant [Nie86].
These two systems are still secure, in the sense that no attack able to realize a total break in an accept-
able time has been proposed up to date. All published algorithms have an exponential running time. In
addition to post-quantum security, code-based cryptosystems have some advantages over conventional
public-key cryptosystems, for example RSA. They possess fast encryption and decryption algorithm
(for comparison see the benchmark data made available by eBATS benchmarking project [BL]). How-
ever, they also suffer from two major problems that seriously limit their practical usability: the public
key size is quite large, and the transmission rate is low.
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Results and outline of the thesis
This thesis contributes to designing three classes of code-based cryptosystems, namely stream-ciphers,
hash functions, and authenticated encryptions scheme as well as to solving the problem of selecting
secure parameters for the McEliece-like cryptosystems. After introducing the required notions of
code-based cryptography for understanding this thesis in Chapter 2, we present the following results
and discuss the main open problems as well as future research directions in the respective chapter.
Code-based Stream Ciphers (Chapter 3). In chapter 3, we first start with the description of all
existing code-based stream ciphers that have been proposed in the literature, namely the Pseudo-
random generator due to Fischer and Stern [FS96], and the SYND stream cipher proposed by Gaborit
et al [GLS07]. Then, we present our three contributions in this area. The first contribution consists
in designing a new code-based stream-cipher following the sponge construction, called 2SC, which
stands for ”Sponge Code-based Stream Cipher”. This cipher runs faster than previous proposals,
but suffers from the drawback of possessing large matrices. The second contribution consists in
improving the SYND stream cipher in terms of speed by replacing the transformation used in SYND
by a new one without loss of security reduction to the regular syndrome decoding problem. The
new resulting cipher, called XSYND (eXtended SYND), performs all previous constructions in terms
of performance in practice and is shown to be provably secure in the sense that if any adversary is
able to distinguish the key stream produced by XSYND, he can solve a hard instance of the regular
syndrome decoding problem. Futhermore, XSYND requires small storage capacity compared to 2SC.
The last contribution is to show how to construct a parallel variant of XSYND, called Parallel SYND
(in short PSYND) and hence obtaining a faster stream cipher, whose security is still based on the same
problem as SYND and XSYND. At the time of writing of this thesis, we are not aware of any similar
code-based stream cipher that has less storage requirements and a faster key stream generation.
Code-based Hash Functions (Chapter 4). This chapter deals with the design of hash functions
based on coding theory. We first start by describing the Fast Syndrome Based hash family [AFS03,
AFS05, FGS07] (in short FSB) and recalling its main features. Then, we present our main contri-
bution, which consists in showing how to incorporate the ideas of FSB and the sponge construction
due to Bertoni et al. [BDPA07] to design a variant of FSB hash function, called Sponge-FSB (in short
SFSB). The security of this variant is based on the same problems as FSB, and outperforms FSB in
terms of speed. Our experimental results show that our proposal is up to 30 % faster in practice than
FSB using appropriate parameters.
Parameters Choice for the McEliece-like cryptosystems (Chapter 5). In this chapter, we address
the problem of choosing optimal parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem that provide security until
a given year and give detailed recommendations. Following the Lenstra-Verheul model, which uses
a set of explicitly formulated parameter settings, combined with existing data points about future
hardware and software developments, we propose parameters that provide the desired security level
until a given year and optimize the key sizes.
2
Chapter 2
Preliminaries and Definitions
In this chapter, we will introduce the shared notations and some mathematical definitions for all fol-
lowing chapters. Furthermore, we recall a number of essential security notions and basic tools that
are needed for understanding the rest of this thesis.
2.1. Mathematical notation
Scalar, Vectors, Sets, and Matrices. We write scalars using italic Roman lowercase letters (e.g.
x) or, sometimes, italic Greek lowercase (e.g. α). Vectors are denoted by bold fonts (e.g. x). The
coefficients of a vector are noted using the same letter but with the bold removed. For instance, the
ith coefficient of the vector y is written yi. We use sans-serif fonts to denote matrices (e.g. A). The
transpose of a matrix A (resp.of a vector x) is denoted A> (resp. x>). The coefficient located at
the intersection of the ith row and the jth column of the matrix A is denoted ai, j. We write sets
using upper-case letters (e.g. S). We write usual sets of numbers using the blackboard font (e.g. N
for the natural numbers). The explicit definition of a set is denoted using the curly brackets (e.g.
S = {1,2, . . . ,10}= {i | i = 1, . . . ,10}). The length of the binary string x is denoted |x|. A finite field
consisting of q elements is written Fq.
Operators. The symbol ”‖” is used to indicate the concatenation operator. If x and y are two equal-
sized vectors, then x⊕y denotes their bitwise XOR. We denote by ” · ” the matrix-vector multiplica-
tion. The symbol ”←” is used for assignment, while ”=” as well as ”≡” for comparison. When using
”≡”, we mean equality modulo an equivalence relation (e.g. a≡ b mod q). The inner product of two
bit vectors a and b (of the same size) is defined by 〈a,b〉 ≡ ∑i aibi mod 2.
Functions. Regarding functions, we use standard mathematical notations. That is, if f is a function
that takes as input elements from a set X and outputs elements from a set Y , then we denote this by
f : X → Y . The set X is called the domain of f and Y the range of f .
3
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Distributions. Let S be a finite set. The statement x $←− S means that x is distributed uniformly over
the set S. If D is a distribution, then we denote by x $←−D the event that x is a random variable selected
according to D. We denote by Un the uniform distribution over the set Fn2 = {0,1}n. A function
µ : N→ [0,1] is called negligible if for all polynomials p, there exists some n0 > 1 such that for all
n> n0, µ(n)< | 1p(n) |.
2.2. Standard notions
Algorithms. Algorithms are written using lowercase calligraphic letters (e.g. A). The execution of
an algorithm A with inputs x to produce an output a is written as a←A(x) or A(x) = a. An algorithm
is said to be efficient, if it runs in Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT).
Computational indistinguishability and pseudorandomness. Indistinguishability is a fundamen-
tal notion in complexity theory. It originates from [GM82] and was presented in a more general way
in [Yao82a]. Informally, two probability distributions are computationally indistinguishable if no effi-
cient algorithm (called the ”distinguisher”) can tell them apart better than with a negligible probability.
Formally, this can be stated as follows. Let (Xn)n and (Yn)n be sets of probability distributions, where
Xn and Yn are probability distributions over {0,1}p(n) for some polynomial p(n). We say that (Xn)n and
(Yn)n are computationally indistinguishable if for all non-uniform PPT distinguisher D , there exists a
negligible function ε(n) such that
∀n ∈ N, Pr[t← Xn,D(t) = 1]−Pr[t← Yn,D(t) = 1]< ε(n).
Based on the definition of computational indistinguishability, we next want to define the notion of
pseudo-random distributions. Let Un denote the uniform distribution over {0,1}n. We say that a
distribution is pseudo-random if it is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution.
2.3. Coding Theory & Cryptography
In this section, we start with a short introduction to coding theory. Then we briefly recall some
concepts and definitions from coding theory and code-based cryptography that we will rely upon
later. For more details we refer the reader to the books [MS77, Lin98].
2.3.1. Introduction
The theory of error-correcting codes was originally introduced in 1948 by Claude Shannon in his
paper ”A Mathematical Theory of Communication” [Sha48]. The study of error-correcting codes is
called coding theory. This field is concerned with sending digital information over a noisy channel
that adds errors to the transmitted data. Its main goal is to construct coding systems that can detect and
correct such errors. The applications of coding theory include, for example, satellite communication,
data transmission, data storage, mobile communication, file transfer, and digital audio/video trans-
mission. The core idea of coding theory is to systematically introduce some redundancy to messages
4
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for allowing transmission errors not only to be detected but also to be corrected. In other words, the
sender first selects a message, which is represented as a string of symbols over some alphabet. This
message is encoded (encoding process) into a longer string over the same alphabet, called a codeword,
and then transmitted over a noisy channel. The channel adds errors (or noise) by modifying some of
the characters of the transmitted string, then delivers the corrupted string to the receiver. The receiver
finally tries to decodes the delivered message by using some knowledge (decoding process), hopefully
to the intended message. This idea is similar to that used by McEliece to construct the first code-based
cryptosystem [McE78].
2.3.2. Basic Definitions from Codes
Definition 2.3.1 (Linear Error-Correcting code). A q-ary (linear) error-correcting code (or code) C
of length n over Fq is a subspace of Fnq. The dimension k of C is the dimension of C as an Fq-vector
space. Elements of Fnq are called words and elements of C are called codewords. The difference n− k
is called the co-dimension of C . A code with these features is called an [n,k] code. For q = 2, C is
called a binary linear code. The code rate R of C is defined as the ratio between its dimension and its
length, i.e. R = kn .
Definition 2.3.2 (Hamming weight, Hamming distance). The Hamming weight (or weight) wt(x) of
a word x is the number of non-zero entries in x. The Hamming distance d(x,y) between two words x,
y is the number of entries i such that xi 6= yi.
Definition 2.3.3 (Regular word). A word x of length n and weight wt(x) = ω is called regular, if it is
composed of ω blocks of length nω , where each block has only a single non-zero entry.
Definition 2.3.4 (2-Regular word). A 2-Regular word is defined as a sum of two regular words. It is
of length n and weight less or equal to 2ω.
Definition 2.3.5 (Minimum distance, relative distance). The minimum distance d (or just distance)
of code C is the smallest distance between distinct codewords, i.e. d = min{d(x,y);x,y ∈ C ,x 6= y}.
The ratio dn is called the relative distance of C , where n is the code length.
If C is a linear code, the minimum distance d of C is the same as the minimum weight of the non-
zero codewords of C , i.e. d = min{wt(x);x ∈ C ,x 6= 0}. If the minimum weight d of an [n,k] code is
known, we refer to the code as an [n,k,d] code.
For decoding a word belonging to a subset S of the space Fnq relative to a code, the usual method
is to link a codeword having minimum distance to that word. To this purpose, we use the so-called
error-correcting (or decoding) algorithm.
Definition 2.3.6 (Error-correcting algorithm). Let C be an [n,k] code defined over Fq, S a subset of
the space Fnq, and δ a positive integer. An δ-error correcting algorithm AC for C is defined by the
following equation:
∀x ∈ S, AC (x) = {y ∈ C ;d(x,y)≤ δ}.
Let C be an [n,k,d] code, and a word x in Fnq. For any positive integer δ with δ ≤ b (d−1)2 c, there
exists at most one codeword y∈ C satisfying d(x,y)≤ δ. As a result, the word x is uniquely decodable
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to codeword x. The positive integer b (d−1)2 c is called the error-correction capability of the code C . As
we can see, the minimum distance d is important in determining the error-correction capability of an
[n,k,d] code. The higher the minimum distance, the more errors the code can correct.
The two most common ways to define a linear [n,k] code are whether with a generator matrix or
with a parity check matrix. Such matrices are defined as follows.
Definition 2.3.7 (Generator matrix). A generator matrix for an [n,k] code C is any k× n matrix G
whose rows form a basis for C . In this case, we have C = {z ·G,z ∈ Fkq}. If G = [Ik ‖ A], where Ik
is the k× k identity matrix and A is an k× (n− k) matrix , then we say that G is in systematic (or
standard) form.
Definition 2.3.8 (Parity check matrix). A parity check matrix H for an [n,k] code C is any (n−k)×n
matrix defined by C = {x ∈ Fnq,H ·x> = 0}.
It is easy to check that if G = [Ik ‖ A] is a generator matrix for an an [n,k] code C in systematic
form, then H= [−A> ‖ In−k] is a parity check matrix for C .
Definition 2.3.9 (Syndrome). Let C be an [n,k] code over Fq, and let H be a parity check matrix for
C . For any x ∈ Fnq, the syndrome of x is the vector sH = H ·x> ∈ Fn−kq .
As we can see, the syndrome depends on the choice of the parity check matrix H. Therefore, it is
more suitable to denote the syndrome by sH to emphasize this dependance. However, for simplicity
of notation, the index H is eliminated whenever there is no risk of ambiguity.
The Gilbert-Varshamov (GV) bound is a lower bound on rate of a code. It provides a sufficient
condition for the existence of a linear code. It was actually proved in two independent works, first
for general random codes by Gilbert [Gil] and then for linear random codes by Varshamov [Var57].
Before defining this bound, we need the following definition.
Definition 2.3.10 (Entropy function). For a positive integer q ≥ 2, the q-ary entropy function hq :
[0,1]→ R is defined as follows: hq(x) =−x logq(x)− (1− x) logq(1− x).
Of special interest is the binary (q = 2) entropy function: h2(x) =−x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x).
The function hq is continuous and strictly increasing on [0,1− 1q ] with hq(0) = 0 and hq(1− 1q).
The binary entropy function h2 is symmetric with respect to line x= 12 and satisfies h2(1−x) = h2(x).
Furthermore, for z∈ [0,1], the inverse h−1q (z) is defined as the unique x∈ [0,1− 1q ] such that hq(x) = z.
Definition 2.3.11 (Gilbert-Varshamov bound). Let n, k, and d be positive integers such that 2≤ d ≤ n
and 1≤ k≤ n. If
d−2
∑
i=0
(n−1
i
)
(q−1)i < qn−k, then there exists a linear [n,k]-code over Fq with minimum
distance at least d.
There exists a asymptotic version of the GV bound, which is stated using the relative distance and
the entropy function hq. This version reads as follows.
Definition 2.3.12 (Asymptotic Gilbert-Varshamov bound). Let q ≥ 2. For every 0 ≤ δ < 1− 1q , and
0< ε≤ 1−hq(δ), there exists a code with rate R≥ 1−hq(δ)− ε , and relative distance δ.
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2.3.3. Some Examples of Codes
In this section we briefly describe some important classes of linear codes that we will use in the sub-
sequent chapters of this thesis. These codes have introduced to construct a number of cryptographic
primitives from coding theory. We will start by presenting Goppa codes, followed by (quasi-) cyclic
codes.
Goppa codes
These codes were first defined by V .D. Goppa in [Gop70]. They constitute a family of q−ary linear
codes and can be defined as follows. Let q be an arbitrary prime power and m, n be two positive
integers such that m≥ 2 and n≤ qm. Let also L = {α1,α2, · · · ,αn} be a subset of distinct elements of
Fqm .
Definition 2.3.13 (q−ary Goppa codes). Let t be an integer such that 0< t < n. Let g(x) ∈ Fqm [x] be
a polynomial of degree t, called Goppa polynomial, such that g(αi) 6= 0, for all 1≤ i≤ n. The q−ary
Goppa code Gq(L,g) is defined by
Gq(L,g) = {x ∈ Fnq,
n
∑
i=0
xi
x−αi ≡ 0 mod g(x)}.
Another way to describe Goppa codes is to consider the definition using the parity check matrix
(see[MS77] for more details). In this definition, the Goppa code is defined as the the set of vectors a∈
Fnqm , whose coordinates are labeled with the elements of L in the following way a= (aα1 ,aα2 , · · · ,aαn)
and satisfy the equation H ·a> = 0, where H is a parity check matrix given by
H=

1
g(α1)
1
g(α2) · · · 1g(αn)
α1
g(α1)
α2
g(α2) · · ·
αn
g(αn)
...
...
. . .
...
αt−11
g(α1)
αt−12
g(α2) · · ·
αt−1n
g(αn)

Since Fqm can be seen as a m-dimensional vector space over Fq, then the matrix H can be written as
a matrix over Fq of size mt×n.
If g(x) is irreducible, then Gq(L,g) is an irreducible Goppa code. In this thesis, we only consider
binary Goppa codes, i.e. q = 2, which are denoted G(L,g). For such codes we have the following
results.
Theorem 2.3.1 ([MS77]). Let G(L,g) be an [n,k,d] Goppa code. Then we have
• k ≥ n−mt, where t is the degree of g
• d ≥ 2 deg(g∗)+ 1, where g∗ is the square-free polynomial, which has the highest degree and
divides g
• there exists deg(g∗)-error correcting algorithm for G(L,g).
Theorem 2.3.2 ([vdV90]). Let g(x) ∈ F2m [x] be a square-free polynomial of degree t with no roots in
F2m . Let also G(L,g) be the corresponding [n,k] Goppa code. If we choose t < 2
m
2−1, then we have
k = n−mt.
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Cyclic codes
Cyclic codes were first introduced by Prange [Pra57] in 1957. They form a fundamental subclass
of linear codes and have wide applications in data storage systems and in communication systems
due to their interesting algebraic structure and efficient encoding/decoding algorithms. They can be
described as follows.
Definition 2.3.14 (Cyclic code). An [n,k] linear code C is cyclic if the cyclic shift of a codeword x∈ C
is also a codeword in C . That is, x = (x1,x2, · · · ,xn) ∈ C ⇒ x′ = (xn,x1, · · · ,xn−1) ∈ C .
Another way to define cyclic codes are cyclic (or circulant) matrices.
Definition 2.3.15 (Cyclic (or circulant) matrix). Let A be a square matrix of size n×n. A is cyclic if
every row of the matrix is a cyclic shift of the row above, i.e.
A=

a1 a2 · · · an
an a1 · · · an−1
...
. . . . . .
...
a2 · · · an a1

As we can see, this matrix is fully specified by its first row (or column), which allows to reduce the
size of the storage memory. Instead of storing the whole matrix, one need to store only its first row
(or column).
Quasi-Cyclic (QC) codes
Quasi-cyclic codes are a generalization of cyclic codes and can be defined as follows.
Definition 2.3.16 (Quasi-cyclic code). An [n,k] linear code C with n = mn0 and k = mk0 is called
quasi-cyclic if the cyclic shift of a codeword x ∈ C by n0 symbols is also a codeword in C . That is,
x = (x1,x2, · · · ,xn) ∈ C ⇒ x′ = (xn−n0 , · · · ,x1, · · · ,xn−n0−1) ∈ C .
A cyclic code is quasi-cyclic with n0 = 1. As before, a QC code can be defined using a quasi-cyclic
matrix as follows.
Definition 2.3.17 (Quasi-cyclic matrix). An k× n block matrix with n = mn0 and k = mk0 is called
quasi-cyclic if each block is a cyclic matrix of size m×m.
In code-based cryptography, (QC) codes are used to construct many cryptographic primitives in or-
der to improve their efficiency in practice. Some of these primitives will be presented in the following
chapters.
2.3.4. Computational Problems
The security of the cryptosystems presented in this thesis rely on the hardness of the subsequent prob-
lems: The Syndrome Secoding (SD) problem and its two variants the Regular Syndrome Decoding
(RSD), and the 2-Regular Null Syndrome Decoding (2-NRSD) problem. In this thesis we will use
only the binary versions of these problems. That is, we consider q = 2.
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Definition 2.3.18 (Syndrome decoding (SD)). Given an (n− k)× n binary matrix H, an (n− k)-bit
vector s, and an integer ω> 0. Find an n-bit word x of weight ω such that H ·x> = s.
This problem is proven NP-complete in [McE78] and decades of research in coding theory indicate
that it is hard in the average case [Bar98]. Note that its extended variant Fq of this problem is also
showed NP-complete in [Bar94].
A special case of this problem is called the regular syndrome decoding (RSD) problem, which
only has solutions in the set of regular words. This is proven NP-complete in [AFS05], and reads as
follows.
Definition 2.3.19 (Regular Syndrome decoding (RSD)). Given an (n− k)× n binary matrix H, an
(n− k)-bit vector s, and an integer ω> 0. Find n-bit regular word x of weight ω such that H ·x> = s.
A further NP-complete variant of the SD problem, introduced also in [AFS05], is the 2-Regular
Null Syndrome Decoding (2-NRSD), which can be stated as follows.
Definition 2.3.20 (2-Regular Null Syndrome Decoding (2-NRSD)). Given an (n− k)×n binary ma-
trix H, and an integer ω > 0. Find an n-bit word x of weight less than or equal to 2ω such that
H ·x> = 0.
In practice, all generic known algorithms to solve the above problems run in exponential time. We
will discuss some of these algorithms in more details later.
2.4. Some Cryptographic Primitives
Cryptographic primitives are the most basic building blocks for creating cryptographic systems, that
are designed to achieve security properties such as confidentiality, authentication or anonymity. Such
systems include (authenticated) encryption schemes, hash functions and stream ciphers. In this thesis,
we will look at how to design these three cryptographic systems from coding theory, whose security
is based on the problems introduced in the previous section. For this purpose, we briefly recap the
definition and properties of such primitives.
2.4.1. Encryption Schemes
An encryption scheme is a (mathematical) algorithm where plaintext is converted into so called ciper-
text. There are two basic classes of encryption: symmetric encryption (or secret key encryption) and
asymmetric encryption (or public key encryption). In symmetric encryption, a single key is used both
for encryption and decryption, while in asymmetric encryption, two different keys are used, one for
encryption and one for decryption.
As mentioned in Chapter 1 , the most famous class of asymmetric encryption schemes based on
the hardness of the syndrome decoding problem contains the McEliece and Niederreiter encryption
scheme [McE78, Nie86], which are actually equivalent from the security point of view as shown
in [LDmW94]. In the following lines, we briefly explain how these systems work. The parameters of
these systems are n, k, t with ω<< n.
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The McEliece Public Key Cryptosystem. The McEliece cryptosystem (in its original version) uses
a binary irreducible Goppa code as a trapdoor. This trapdoor is the knowledge of the Goppa polyno-
mial. The McEliece PKC can be described as follows:
• Key Generation: Generate the following matrices:
– G′: k×n generator matrix of a [n,k] binary irreducible Goppa codeG with error-correcting
capability ω
– S: k× k binary non-singular matrix
– P: n×n random permutation matrix
Public Key: (G,ω) with G= SG′P.
Secret Key: (S,AG ,P), where AG is an efficient ω-error correcting algorithm for G .
• Encryption: To encrypt the plaintext x ∈ Fk2
- choose randomly a word e ∈ Fn2 of weight ω
- compute the ciphertext y as y = x ·G⊕ e
• Decryption: To decrypt a ciphertext y
- compute the inverses P−1 and S−1
- calculate y ·P−1 = x ·SG′⊕ e ·P−1
- apply the algorithm AG for G to recover x ·S .
- compute the plaintext x = x ·S ·S−1
The Niederreiter Public Key Cryptosystem. This system is a (dual) variant of the McEliece cryp-
tosystem. It uses a parity check matrix instead a generator matrix. The plaintext x ∈ Fn2 of weight ω,
while the corresponding ciphertext is a syndrome y ∈ Fn−k2 . The Niederreiter cryptosystem consists
of three algorithms:
• Key Generation:
– H′: (n−k)×n parity check matrix of a [n,k] binary irreducible Goppa code G with error-
correcting capability ω
– S: (n− k)× (n− k) binary non-singular matrix
– P: n×n random permutation matrix
Public Key: (H,ω) with H= SH′P.
Secret Key: (S,AG ,P), where AG is an efficient ω-error correcting algorithm for G .
• Encryption: To encrypt plaintext x ∈ Fn2 of weight ω, compute y = H ·x>
• Decryption: To recover x
- compute the inverses P−1 and S−1
- calculate S−1 ·y = H′P ·x>
- apply the algorithm AG for G to recover P ·x> .
- compute the plaintext x via x> = P−1P ·x>
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2.4.2. Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers are a fundamental class of symmetric encryption algorithms, which transform a se-
quence of plaintext symbols (usually binary digits) one at a time, into a sequence of ciphertext sym-
bols by combining plaintext symbols with a pseudo-random sequence, called keystream sequence.
This latter is generated using a (known) initial vector and a secret key. Stream ciphers are commonly
divided into classes: synchronous or self-synchronizing.
The former is one of the topics of this thesis and Chapter 3 is especially devoted to stream ciphers
based on coding theory.
Informally, a synchronous stream cipher can be defined as follows.
Definition 2.4.1 (Synchronous stream cipher). A synchronous stream cipher is one in which the
keystream is produced independently of the plaintext and the ciphertext.
Let K be a secret key and IV be an initial vector. We denote by si an internal state of the cipher. In
a synchronous stream cipher, the encryption (and decryption) process consists of the following steps:
• Initialization: The aim of this step is to produce a (pseudo-random) initial state, s0, by s0 =
f (K, IV ), where f is an initialization function, whose arguments are K and IV .
• Update: In this step, an internal state si is updated as si+1 = g(si), where g is a function, called
update or next state function.
• Output: The key stream, xi, is produced by xi = h(si), where h is a function, called output
function.
• Encryption/Decryption: The ciphertext yi is obtained by combining xi with the plaintext pi
using a combining function k as follows: yi = k(xi, pi). In the most proposed stream ciphers,
the function k is simply the bitwise XOR-operator, i.e. yi = xi⊕ pi. The decryption is then given
by pi = xi⊕ yi.
2.4.3. Hash Functions
A hash function is an important cryptographic primitive used in many applications and protocols
for secure communication such as digital signatures, data integrity, and identification protocols. A
detailed overview on hash functions can be found for example in [Pre93]. An informal definition for
hash functions would be the following.
Definition 2.4.2 (Hash function). A hash function h is a computationally efficient function, which
maps binary strings of arbitrary length to binary strings of some fixed length, called digest or hash.
That is, h : {0,1}∗→{0,1}t , where t is the hash length.
In principle, to be of cryptographic use, a hash function must fulfill three fundamental security re-
quirements: preimage resistance, second preimage resistance and collision resistance. The importance
of these requirements is application dependent. To explain these requirements, let h : {0,1}∗→{0,1}t
be a hash function, where t is the hash length in bits. A hash computation of a plaintext x ∈ {0,1}∗ is
expressed as h(x) = y ∈ {0,1}t .
1. Preimage resistance: Given any hash value y, it is ”computationally infeasible” or ”hard” to
find a plaintext (or message) x such that h(x) = y. In other words, it must be hard to invert h
from y to get x. This property is also known as one-wayness.
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2. Second preimage resistance: Given a plaintext x and its corresponding hash value h(x), it is
”computationally infeasible” or ”hard” to find another plaintext x′ such that
x′ 6= x and h(x′) = h(x).
3. Collision resistance: It is ”computationally infeasible” or ”hard” hard to find any two plaintexts
(or message) x′ and x such that
x′ 6= x and h(x′) = h(x).
A hash function f that transforms a fixed-length input and to a shorter, fixed-length output, is called
a compression function. That is, f : {0,1}`→{0,1}t , with ` > t.
In practice, for designing hash function, the following modes of operation can be utilized.
The Merkle-Damga˚rd construction (MD). The simplest and most commonly approach for design-
ing hash functions is to iterate a compression function on the plaintext to be hashed. A compression
function is a mapping, which takes a fixed length input and returns a shorter, fixed-length output. This
design principle is called the Merkle-Damga˚rd construction [Mer89, Dam89] (MD), and it works
briefly as follows. Let f be a compression function. First the plaintext to be hashed (with padding)
P, is broken up into equal-sized blocks, i.e. P = (p1, p2, · · · , pl). Then the temporary hash values hi,
called the chaining variable or the internal state, are computed as
hl = f (pl ‖ hl−1) ,
where h0 = IV is a given initial value and hl is the final hash for P. Figure 2.1 illustrates the MD-
construction.
Figure 2.1.: The Merkle-Damga˚rd construction using a compression function f .
The security of this construction is mainly based on the security of the underlying compression
function. More precisely, Merkle [Mer89] and Damga˚rd [Dam89] showed that as long as the compres-
sion function is collision resistant, the resulting hash function is guaranteed to be collision resistant.
Unfortunately, the MD-construction has been shown to be vulnerable to certain generic attacks such
as multi-collision attacks [Jou04] and long-message second-preimage attacks [KS05]. Motivated by
these attacks, new methods of designing hash functions have proposed. One of these methods, called
the Sponge construction is described in the following.
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The Sponge construction (SG). In contrast to the MD-construction, the sponge construction [BDPA07]
is a recently proposed and very interesting hash design, which uses a random permutation or a ran-
dom transformation f , instead of a compression function and supports variable length outputs. If f
is a random permutation, this construction is called P-sponge, otherwise, it is called a T-sponge. The
sponge construction operates on an internal state having a fixed size b = r+ c, where r is the bit rate
and c the capacity of the sponge. Initially, the state is equal to the all-zeros vector, i.e. 0b. Basically,
the sponge construction as depicted in Figure 2.2, proceeds in the following steps:
• Absorbing step: In this step, the plaintext to be hashed is first padded using a padding rule and
cut into r-bit blocks such that the last block absorbed shall not be zero, i.e. P = (p1, p2, · · · , pl)
with |pi|= r for all i and pl 6= 0r. Then each block is XOR-ed with the r-bit part of the current
state si, intervealed by the application of f , resulting in the next state si+1, i.e.
si+1 = f (si⊕ (pi ‖ 0c)), with s0 = 0b.
This process will be iteratively repeated until all blocks are processed.
• Squeezing step: In this step, the state continues to be updated (or permuted) by f followed
by outputting only the r-bit part of the resulting state at each iteration as output blocks. We
denote these blocks by hi. The hash value h of length ` consists of the concatenation of all these
blocks, i.e. h = h1 ‖ h2 ‖ · · · ‖ hN such that `= Nr. The number of iterations (or output blocks)
is chosen by user in order to get the desired hash length.
Figure 2.2.: The sponge construction based on the permutation/transformation f .
The security of SG construction depends on its capacity c, hash length `, and transforation or
permutation f . It has been shown in [BDPA08] that when the internal permutation (resp. internal
transformation) is modeled as a randomly chosen permutation (resp. random chosen transformation),
the expected security bounds offered by a `-bit sponge-based hash function are given in Table 2.1.
Type Collision Preimage 2nd Preimage
P-Sponge min(2
c
2 ,2
`
2 ) min(2
c
2 ,2`) min(2
c
2 ,2`)
T-Sponge min(2
c
2 ,2
`
2 ) min(2c,2`) min( 2
c
|P| ,2
`)
Table 2.1.: The security bounds of the sponge construction against collision, preimage, and 2nd Preimage
attacks, where the quantity |P| is the size of the plaintext to be hashed.
On the other hand, if the SG construction is keyed [BDPA11b], i.e. the message is prefixed with a
secret key of length t, then the best known attack against this construction is exhaustive key search as
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long as the size of the message queries is upper bounded by 2a with a<< c and c≥ t+a+1.
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Code-based Stream Ciphers
This chapter starts with a brief overview of existing constructions of code-based stream ciphers in
Section 3.1. Namely, the pseudo-random generator due to Fisher and Stern [FS96], followed by the
SYND stream cipher, proposed by Gaborit et al. [GLS07]. Then, it presents our three contributions in
this field: the 2SC [MCY11], XSYND [MHC12], and PSYND [MHC] stream cipher. Following the
sponge construction, we present the 2SC stream cipher in Section 3.2, while we describe the XSYND
cipher in Section 3.3, which is an improved version of the SYND cipher in terms of performance.
Finally, the PSYND cipher we present in Section 3.4 can be regarded as a parallel version of XSYND
and outperforms all previous constructions in terms of efficiency.
3.1. Previous Work
This section briefly gives an overview of proposed pseudo-random number generators, which use
error-correcting codes.
3.1.1. The Fischer-Stern’s Pseudo-Random Generator
At Eurocrypt 1996, Fischer and Stern [FS96] presented the first code-based pseudo-random number
generator (FS-PRNG) based on the syndrome decoding problem. This generator uses a collection of
functions, denoted here as ( fn)n≥0, whose domains (Dn)n≥0 are given by
Dn =
{
(H,x) ∈ F`×n2 ×Fn2,wt(x) = ω
}
.
and the collection ( fn)n≥0 are defined by
fn : Dn→ F`(n+1)2 (3.1)
(H,x) 7→ fn(x) =
(
H,H · x>
)
. (3.2)
Thus inverting a function fn implies solving instances of the syndrome decoding (SD) problem.
Hence, if one chooses (n, `,ω) such that the collection corresponds to hard instances of the SD prob-
lem, then it can be regarded as a collection of one-way functions. So, for parameter sets (n, `,ω)
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satisfying the GV bound, we have the following fact: ”For sets of parameters (n, `,ω) satisfying the
GV bound the collection ( fn)n≥0 is one-way.”
Note that the functions fn are expansion functions. They accept strings of length `n+ log2(
(n
ω
)
) bits
and output strings having length `(n+1) bits, since log2(
(n
ω
)
)< `.
Starting from a function fn defined over Dn, Fischer and Stern proposed an iterative construction of a
pseudo-random number generator, which produces `− log2(
(n
ω
)
) key stream bits in each round. One
iteration of this generator is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 One round of Fischer-Stern PRNG
Input : a seed e0 of length dlog2
(n
ω
)e bits
Output : a bit string z of length `−dlog2
(n
ω
)
x← φ(e0) // convert e0 into a word x of length n and weight ω using Algorithm 2.
y← H · x> // multiply x by H
(y1,y2)← y // split y into y1 and y2 with |y1|= dlog2
(n
ω
)e and |y2|= `−dlog2 (nω)e
z← y2 //output z
Figure 3.1.: A diagram of FS-PRNG.
For converting bit strings of size dlog2
(n
ω
)e into words of length n and weight ω, the Fischer-Stern
PRNG uses the encoding algorithm shown in Algorithm 2.
Security analysis. The randomness of the key stream produced by Gn is proven in [FS96] under
two assumptions:
(1) the collection of functions ( fn)n≥0 and
(2) the matrix H is indistinguishable from a random one.
The proof is done by contradiction and briefly works as follows: Assume that the key stream
produced by Gn is not pseudo-random. One first constructs a distinguisher whose input is a string
generated by Gn, say Gn(z) for some random z∈ Fn2, and a random string r ∈ Fn2 and whose output is 1
with different probability. Then one uses this distinguisher to build a predicator allowing to correctly
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Algorithm 2 Guillot’s algorithm φ
Input : an integer e between 0 and
(n
ω
)−1
Output : a binary word x = (x1,x2, · · · ,xn) of length n and weight ω
t← (nω), t ′← 0, j← n
while j > 0 do
t ′← t · j−ωj
if e≤ t ′ then
x j← 0
t← t ′
else
x j← 1
e← e− t ′
t← t · ωn
end if
j← j−1
end while
guess the inner product of x and r with success probability at least 12 +
1
2p(n) , for every polynomial
p(n). In doing so, they obtain a contradiction to the one-wayness of ( fn)n≥0 using the Goldreich-
Levin Theorem [GL89].
Performance. As explained above, a string y2 ∈ F`−dlog2 (
n
w)e
2 is produced in each iteration. To do so,
one needs to first multiply an `×n matrix H by a string from Wn,w. This can solely be performed by
XORing ω columns of H leading to `ω binary operations. The columns positions are determined by
the indexes j of x with x j = 1 in Algorithm 2, which needs the computations of binomial coefficients
and necessitates arithmetic operations on large integers. This approximately requires O(n2 log2(n))
binary operations. As a consequence, the whole cost of generating `−dlog2
(n
ω
)e bits amounts to
around O(n2 log2(n))+`ω binary operations. In practice, the authors claimed that their system outputs
3500 bits per second on a SUN Sparc10 station using (n, `,ω) = (512,256,55).
In order to increase the performance of the generator, Fischer and Stern proposed to precompute the
binomial coefficients and store them in a table. For a code with parameters (n, `,ω), the memory
needed to store these coefficients is (ω`n) bits, since we need ωn entries, each of them of size ` bits.
Furthermore, a space of `(n− `) bits due to the matrix H is required.
Proposed parameters. Their values are listed in Table 3.1 with n = 2` and log2
(n
ω
)
< `, for which
the GV-bound condition is fulfilled.
3.1.2. The SYND stream cipher
Motivated by the inefficiency of Fischer-Stern PRNG [FS96], Gaborit et al. [GLS07] proposed the
SYND stream cipher as an improved variant with two main features: introducing quasi-cyclic matrices
reduces the storage capacity and replacing the above encoder by a new one. This so called regular
encoder is used in [AFS05], and considerably speeds up the key stream generation. As for most stream
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n ` ω key/IV speed sec-level
(bits) (cycles/byte) log2(# bin.Ops)
512 256 55 247 360410 60
728 364 71 331 38140 78
728 364 78 353 40330 85
1024 512 100 468 25810 100
1024 512 110 613 26970 120
Table 3.1.: Proposed parameters for FS-PRNG in [FS96].
ciphers, keystream generation of SYND consists of three phases: the initialization, the update and the
output steps.
(1) Initialization: It is depicted in Figure 3.2. The aim of this phase is to produce an initial state e0
using a secret key K and an initial vector IV of the same length `/2 bits. This is achieved as
follows. Let g1 and g2 be two syndrome maps defined by
g1 : F`2→ F`2 (3.3)
x 7→ g1(x) = A · (φ(x))> (3.4)
and
g2 : F`2→ F`2 (3.5)
x 7→ g2(x) = B · (φ(x))> (3.6)
A graphical illustration of gi (i = 1,2) is shown in Figure 3.3. The matrices A and B are
two random cyclic of the same size `× n with ` = ω log2(n/ω)and x 7→ φ(x) is an encoding
algorithm, called a (n,ω) regular encoder, transforming an ` bits string into regular words of
length n and weight ω. This encoder is presented in Algorithm 3. The purpose of this algorithm
is to speed up the vector-matrix multiplication, which only consists in XORing of ω columns
of the underlying matrix. Here we assume that n/ω is an integer such that n/ω = 2α for some
α> 0. Note that in [AFG+08] a further regular encoding algorithm has been introduced, which
mixes the input bits to produce a regular word.
Figure 3.2.: A diagram of the initialization function f used in SYND.
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Algorithm 3 Regular Encoder φ
Input : x a binary string of ` bits with `= ω log2(n/ω)
Output : a regular word z = φ(x) of length n and weight ω.
z = (z1, · · · ,zn)← 0n (initializing with n zeros)
for i = 1 to ω−1 do
Extract the log2 (n/ω) right bits of x
Convert those bits into an integer k between 0 and n/ω−1
z(i·n/ω)+k← 1
Shift x to the right by log2 (n/ω) bits
end for
Figure 3.3.: A diagram of mappings x→ gi(x).
Starting from the mapping (gi)i=1,2, a further mapping f is build as an initialization function to
generate an initial state e0 of length `. This function is defined by
f : F`/22 ×F`/22 → F`2
(x‖y) 7→ f (x‖y) = (x‖y)⊕g1(x‖y)⊕g2 ((x‖y)⊕g1((x‖y)⊕g1(x‖y)))
Where (x‖y) denotes the concatenation of x and y. Obviously computing e0 exactly requires
three XOR operations and three function evaluations. We can estimate the number of XORs
needed to evaluate f (x||y): the evaluation of g1 (or g2) can be performed in ω` binary XORs
and each XOR-operation of two binary vectors of length ` needs ` binary XORs. This means,
that the generation of e0 requires 3`(1+ω) binary operations.
(2) Update: During this phase, the initial state is updated several times (say λ times) by calling the
mapping g1 to produce an internal state ei+1 as ei+1← g1(ei) with e0 = f (K, IV ).
(3) Output: In this step, the resulting internal state ei is fed through the mapping g2 to generate the
keystream, which is XOR-ed with the cleartext to get a ciphertext. The whole process of key
stream generation is depicted in Figure 3.4
Security analysis. In the above description, the main building blocks of the SYND stream cipher
are the functions g1 and g2. Thus the security of SYND can be reduced to the RSD problem presented
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Figure 3.4.: A diagram of the key stream generation of SYND.
earlier. Indeed, state recovery or key recovery consists in inverting either g1 or g2, which is equivalent
to solving instances of regular syndrome decoding problem. Furthermore, the authors of SYND did
not deliver an explicit security reduction proof. They only pointed out that the proof is a generalization
of [BGP09] and [FS96] and the proof will be detailed in the full version. The main result of their
proof is the following: If there exists an algorithm A distinguishing a random bit sequence from the
sequence of the bit key stream produced through a known random (or a quasi-cyclic random) `× n
matrix multiplied by an unknown randomly chosen regular word e in time T and advantage ε, then
there exists an algorithmA ′ that can recover e in time T ′≈ 27`2λ2Tε2 , where λ is the number of iterations.
Performance. Theoretically the performance of SYND can be expressed as the number of binary
XORs to produce ` bits of the keystream. To do this, we have to count the average number of XORs
in each step. As mentioned above, the initialization step requires about 3`(1+ω) binary XORs. The
complexity of the update and the output phase is about Nω and ω binary XORs respectively, where
N is the number of rounds made during the update process. Thus, the whole complexity to produce a
keystream of ` bits is about
3`+ `ω(2N+3) binary operations
Regarding the storage requirements, one needs to store ` bits coming from key size and initial vector
and the n bits of first row of the random quasi-cyclic matrix of size `×n.
Proposed parameters. They are shown in Table 3.2. For efficiency reason, n = 8192, ` = 256
and ω = 32 are the proposed parameter. The implemenation results given in [GLS07] provide 27
cycles/byte on Pentium IV running at 3.4 GHz versus 26 cycles/byte for AES-CTR according the best
AES-implementation in 2007. At the time of writing this chapter, there exists no-free implementation
of SYND made by the authors. The only available implementation of SYND has been first presented
in [MCY11]. An optimized version of this implementation is recently proposed in [CSM] (see the
subsequent section) and shows that SYND only runs at 30.27 instead of 26 cycles/byte as claimed
in [GLS07]. We will make our comparison based on this optimized implementation [CSM]. The
security levels listed below are estimated according to the best known attack [MMT11].
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n = 8192
ω ` key/IV size speed sec-level
(bits) (cycles/byte) log2(# bin.Ops)
32 256 128 26 90
48 384 192 47 155
128 1024 512 83 370
Table 3.2.: Performance of SYND given in [GLS07]
3.2. The 2SC Stream Cipher
In this section, the first contribution in the context of stream ciphers will be presented. We propose
here a novel stream cipher, called the sponge code-based stream cipher (in short 2SC), following the
sponge construction. The main goal of this section is to show how to design a new stream cipher,
which runs much faster than the SYND cipher described in the previous section.
In the description of 2SC, we will preserve the same notations as before. The main parameters are
(n, `,ω) with ` = ω log2(n/ω) = r+ c, where r and c are the parameters characterizing the sponge
construction.
3.2.1. Description of the 2SC cipher
The 2SC is a family of synchronous stream cipher supporting the key/initial vector (IV) lengths of
144, 208, and 352 bits, respectively. As for most stream ciphers, the key stream generation process
consists of two phases:
(1) initialization: an initial state of the cipher is created using the key K and the initial vector IV
having the same length `/2, and
(2) the key stream generation: the state is repeatedly updated (Update step) and used to generate
key stream bits (Squeezing step).
These two phases use two different functions f and g and are defined as follows.
Initialization. The initialization function f takes a key K and an initial vector IV and returns an
initial state as follows:
f : F|K|2 ×F|IV |2 → F`2
(x1,x2) 7→ f (x1,x2) = f1
(
f [r]1 (x1‖0c)⊕ x2, f [c]1 (x1‖0c)
)
,
where ”‖” denotes the concatenation and ”0t” is the all-zero vector of size t. We write f [r]1 (z) ( resp.
f [c]1 (z) ) the r-bit (resp. c-bit) part of the output f1(z) for an input z from F`2, where f1 is defined by:
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f1 : F`2→ F`2
x 7→ f1(x) = A · (φ(x))>.
Here, the function x 7→ φ(x) is a regular encoder described above in Algorithm 3, which converts a
`-bit string into a regular word of length n and weight ω. The matrix A is a random binary matrix of
size `×n. The whole process of generating an initial state is shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5.: The Initialization function f of the 2SC stream cipher, where f1(x) = A · (φ(x))>.
Update. During this step, an additional function g is used to update the internal state several times.
The number of times (say λ) that g is run is chosen by the user, affecting both the security and the
efficiency of the construction. The function g is defined by:
g : F`2→ F`2 (3.7)
x 7→ g(x) = B · (φ(x))>, (3.8)
where A is a binary random matrix having the same size as B.
Squeezing. Let e0 be the initial state returned by f and eλ−1 = g(λ−1)(e0), where g(λ−1) is the
composition of g with itself (λ− 1) times. The keystream of SC consists of r-bit blocks (zi)i≥1
computed as follows:
• z1 consists of the first r bits of the internal state eλ−1 after calling g, i.e. z1 = g[r](eλ−1)
• For i≥ 2, zi = g[r](eλ+i−2).
The entire process explaining Update and Squeezing steps is shown in Figure 3.6.
Having the key stream bits zi, the ciphertext ci is obtained by combining the plainttest block mi with
zi using the XOR-operation as in the one-time pad encryption scheme.
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Figure 3.6.: The Update and Squeezing phases of the 2SC cipher, where g(x) = B · (φ(x))>.
3.2.2. Security Analysis
The security of 2SC is discussed in this subsection. We first show that, the output of 2SC is pseudo-
random, i.e., the probability to distinguish the key stream output by 2SC from a random sequence is
negligible. Then we analyze the security of 2SC from practical point of view by demonstrating that,
in practice, it is hard to recover states or reconstruct the secret data (K and IV ) from the key stream.
Pseudorandomess of the key stream. In order to prove that the output of 2SC is pseudo-random,
we define some useful concepts.
Definition 3.2.1. A family U of hash functions u ∈ U with u : X → Y is called universal if for all
x 6= x′ we have
Prob[u(x) = u(x′) | u sampled randomly from U]≤ 1
b
,
where x,x′ ∈ X and b = |Y |.
Next, we introduce the Subset Sum Problem (SSP), which is closely related to the syndrome de-
coding problem. The SSP has been proved NP-complete by Karp in [Kar72] and can be stated as
follows.
Definition 3.2.2 (Subset Sum Problem (SSP)). Given n integers (h1, · · · ,hn), each of ` bits, and and
an integer y called the target, find a subset S⊂ {1, · · · ,n} such that ∑ j∈S h j = y mod 2`.
As stated in [IN96], this problem is equivalent to inverting the function
gh(S) =∑
j∈S
h j = y mod 2`. (3.9)
This function maps an n-bit string to `-bit string. When the cardinality |S| of S is upper bounded by
a fixed integer ω (i.e. |S| ≤ ω), we get an instance of the (regular) syndrome decoding stated earlier.
More precisely, take |S|=ω; then the elements in S can be interpreted as the positions of the non-zero
coordinates of an incidence vector x. Thus x has weight |S| = ω. The elements (h1, · · · ,hn) are the
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rows of a matrix H of size `×n. The target y is the syndrome such that H · x> = y.
Without loss of generality, the transformation f in the initialization step and the equivalent transfor-
mation g can be regarded as a mapping x 7→ u(x) = H · x>, x is a regular word, because the encoding
function φ is bijective.
In what follows, we will use R to denote the set of regular words having length n and weight ω
and H to indicate the set of binary random matrices of size `× n. In order to prove that the family
U = {u : u(x) = H · x>,x ∈ R ,H ∈H } is universal, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2.1. There exists, on average, only one solution of each instance RSD(n, `,ω), where ` =
ω log2(n/ω).
Proof. Let Nrsd(n, `,ω) denotes the expected number of solutions of an instance RSD(n, `,ω). This
number is defined as the number of regular words divided by the number of the syndromes, i.e.
Nrsd(n, `,ω) =
( nω)
ω
2` . By replacing ` by the value ω log2(n/ω), we obtain Nrsd(n, `,ω) = 1.
Proposition 3.2.1. The family U = {u : u(x) = H · x>,x ∈ R ,H ∈H } is universal.
Proof. From Lemma 3.2.1, we know that there exists on average only one regular word that solves
the syndrome decoding problem. Thus, it follows that for all for all x 6= x′
Pr[H · x> = H · x′> | H sampled randomly from H ] = 0≤ 1
2`
Now we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2.1. The probability of distinguishing the output of each u ∈U from a random sequence
of length ` is negligible.
Proof. The proof is deduced from [IN96] and works as follows. As explained above, the family U
can be seen as a collection gh defined as in equation (3.9). Due to Proposition 3.2.1 this collection
of transformations is universal and therefore, as proved in [IN96], we can apply the Leftover hash
lemma [IZ89] to show that if ` < γn for some real number γ< 1, then the expected distinguishibility
of gh(S) = H · x> and a random y ∈ F`2 is at most 2
−(1−γ)n
2 .
In our setting, γ can be obtained as follows:
ψ(n,ω) =
`
n
=
log2(n/ω)
(n/ω)
.
For simplicity, we can assume that n> 4ω. In this case, the function ψ tends to zero when n is chosen
to be large enough. Consequently, there exists an n0 such that for all n≥ n0, ψ(n,ω) is upper bounded
by a constant γ < 1/2. Thus, for values of the code length n such that (1−γ)n2 is large enough, the
probability of distinguishing the output of any function u ∈U from a random sequence of length ` is
negligible.
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Pseudorandomness of the initial state. The initialization process of the 2SC consists of two
stages. During the first stage, the secret key K is introduced to generate a pre-initial state. For suitably
chosen parameters (n, `,ω), as indicated in [GLS07], the underlying syndrome mapping behaves like
a random function, since its outputs are indistinguishable from a random sequence. Therefore, the
pre-initial state is pseudo-random. During the second stage, the outer r-bit part of this state is first
XORed with a secret initial value. Then, the resulting `-bit vector is fed to the function f to pro-
duce the initial state. This process can be viewed as XORing ω random columns of a random matrix,
resulting in a random `-bit initial state.
Best known attacks. In practice, an adversary against the security of 2SC is faced with two prob-
lems. On the one hand, knowing the blocks zi of r bits does not allow him to get the remaining c bits;
the larger the capacity, the more secure the system is. On the other hand, even having successfully
guessed those bits, the adversary must solve an instance of the RSD problem. However, solving the
RSD problem efficiently is as difficult as SD in average case, for an appropriately chosen parameter
set. Indeed, all known attacks for SD are fully exponential; in fact, only three kinds of algorithms can
attack the SD-based systems: Information Set Decoding (ISD), the Generalized Birthday Algorithm
(GBA), and structural decoding. Which of the two approaches is more efficient depends on the pa-
rameters and the cryptosystem. In our setting, each instance of RSD has on average one solution due
to the form of the regular words; here the best known attack is the GBA, as shown in [FS09]. The
most recent GBA against code-based crytosystems is proposed in [FS09] and will be used to select
secure parameters for 2SC.
Remark 3.2.1. One could also use Time Memory trade-off attacks against stream ciphers. This attack
was first introduced in [Hel80] as a generic method of attacking block ciphers. To avoid it, one must
adjust the cipher parameters as shown in [HS05, Gol97], i.e., the IV should be at least as large as the
key, and the state should be at least twice the key.
3.2.3. Parameters Choice and Implementation Results
Suitable parameters (n, `,ω) for 2SC should provide both efficiency and high security against all
known attacks. Firstly, we account for Time Memory Trade-Off attacks (see section 5.1) and choose
(n, `,ω) such that `= ω log2(n/ω)≥ 2|IV | and |IV | ≥ |K|.
Since |IV |= |K|= r, we obtain `≤ 2c. We use the following strategy for selecting secure parameters
for 2SC: according the sponge construction, we first fix c such that c/2 is at least the desired security
level, then choose the remaining parameters (n, `,ω) accordingly.
We have implemented 2SC to test a large set of potential parameters for a number of security lev-
els. In practice, optimal parameters for this scheme should also take into account these three main
implementation-specific requirements: the ratio `c , selecting an appropriate block size for the regular
encoding, and the use of int-wise (rather than byte-wise) XORing. A large value of `c yields a large
value of r, hence allowing for better performance. We implement the regular encoding such that it
uses shift operations, thus efficiently using processor architecture. The choice log2(n/ω) = 16 was the
most promising block size in terms of the computation time in our implementation. Finally, int-wise
XORing reduces computation time by four times compared to byte-wise XORing. Our parameters
should thus ensure that we can perform int-wise XORing.
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Putting everything together, the choice of ω, ` and c is a tradeoff decision. On the one hand, a small
ω leads to fewer XOR operations during matrix multiplication. On the other hand, a small ω implies
a small ` (`=ω log2(n/ω) ). Making n large will help in increasing `. But at the same time the matrix
will become very big. Last but not least, the smaller c is chosen, the more efficient the computation
is, because r becomes larger.
In order to compare the speed of 2SC with the speed of SYND [GLS07], we have optimized the
implementations of SYND and 2SC proposed in [MCY11] with the same techniques using the pa-
rameter sets proposed in [GLS07] and [MCY11] respectively. As mentioned earlier, the results given
in [GLS07] can not be checked, since no freely-available implementation of SYND exists. On our
own implementations, we obtained the results presented in Table 3.3 and Table 3.8. For comparable
security levels, 2SC runs faster than SYND. At the same time, SYND needs significantly larger key
sizes compared to 2SC. However, 2SC suffers from the drawback of having to store large matrices. A
graph showing comparison between SYND and 2SC performance for the same security levels is given
in Figure 3.7. In this Figure, the red graph (resp. green graph) represents the interpolation curve that
provides estimates for the performance of SYND (resp. of 2SC) with respect to the expected security
level based on the optimal parameters we found. As one can see, the SYND’s curve is linear, while
the 2SC’s curve is a quadratic function.
Security Level n ` ω Key/IV size Speed
(bits) (cycles/byte)
90 8192 256 32 128 30.27
170 8192 512 64 256 41.50
250 8192 1024 128 512 149.94
Table 3.3.: Performance of SYND using quasi-cyclic codes
Security Level n ` ω c Key/IV size Speed
(bits) (cycles/byte)
90 13 ·219 384 24 240 144 25.12
170 7 ·217 544 34 336 208 33.22
250 29 ·217 928 58 576 352 80.05
Table 3.4.: Performance of 2SC using quasi-cyclic codes
3.3. The XSYND Cipher
As seen in the previous section, the 2SC stream cipher outperforms the SYND cipher in terms of
speed, but it requires huge storage capacity. This section presents our second contribution [MHC12],
which shows how to improve considerably the performance the SYND cipher without using a regular
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Figure 3.7.: A graphical performance comparison between 2SC and SYND.
encoder and without compromising the security of the modified SYND stream cipher. Our new pro-
posal, called the eXtended SYND (in short XSYND), uses a generic state transformation which is also
reducible to the regular syndrome decoding problem, but has better computational characteristics than
the regular encoding. Moreover, unlike SYND, we show how the security reduction of our XSYND
works.
3.3.1. Description of the XSYND cipher
For describing we will use the same notations as before. The XSYND is obtained from SYND by
making the following modifications. Firstly, we modify the f function (Figure 3.2) such that it requires
only two, rather than three function evaluations, without loss of security. We denote the new function
by f ′ and depict it in Fig. 3.8. Note that this modification does not affect the recovery of the secret K
or the initial vector IV . In fact, it is straightforward to prove that, given an initial state e0 output by f ′,
if an adversary can extract K and IV from e0, it can also easily solve an instance RSD(n, `,ω). The
new function f ′ function is defined by:
f ′(x) = y⊕g2(y); y = x⊕g1(x); ∀x = (K, IV ) ∈ F`/22 ×F`/22 .
The second modification in XSYND is to avoid the regular encoding x 7→ φ(x) in functions gi
(i = 1,2) described in Figure 3.3 by using the Randomize-Then-Combine paradigm due to Bellare et
al. [BGG94, BGG95, BM97]. This paradigm is shown in Figure 3.9. More precisely, given an input
x consisting of ω blocks x1,x2, . . . , ,xω , each block being α bits (where α is chosen at will), we first
feed each block through a random function Fi, obtaining an output yi, i.e., Fi(xi) = yi . The values
y1,y2, · · · ,yω are then combined by bitwise XOR to produce the final output y = y1⊕ y2⊕·· ·⊕ yω.
In XSYND, we use the following function Fi: let H be a random binary matrix of size ωα×ω ·2α,
consisting of ω submatrices H1 . . .Hω of size ωα× 2α (we write H = H1|| . . . ||Hω). If we write the
submatrices as Hi = (h
(0)
i ,h
(1)
i , . . . ,h
(2α−1)
i ), where h
( j)
i ∈ Fωα for j ∈ {0,1, . . . ,2α− 1}, then we can
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Figure 3.8.: The initialization function f ′ of XSYND
define Fi by Fi(xi) = yi = h
( j)
i if and only if the decimal value < xi >α of xi is equal to j. We have 2
α
possible value for each yi, depending on the integer value of the block xi. In this way, we redefine the
functions gi as follows:
g1(x) = a
(<x1>α)
1 ⊕a(<x2>α)2 ⊕·· ·⊕a(<xω>α)ω with A= A1|| . . . ||Aω and Ai = (a(0)i ,a(1)i , . . . ,a(2
α−1)
i )
g2(x) = b
(<x1>α)
1 ⊕b(<x2>α)2 ⊕·· ·⊕b(<xω>α)ω with B= B1|| . . . ||Bω and Bi = (b(0)i ,b(1)i , . . . ,b(2
α−1)
i )
Figure 3.9.: Randomize-then-combine paradigm proposed in [BGG94]
Figure 3.10 illustrates the new function g1 introduced in XSYND.
3.3.2. Security of XSYND
In this subsection we analyze the security of XSYND from both the theoretical and practical point
of view. In the theoretical part, we show first that the security of the core mapping introduced in
XSYND is directly reducible to the syndrome decoding problem. More precisely, this mapping can be
expressed as a product of a parity check matrix by a regular word such that the security of our proposal
is equivalent of that of SYND. After that, we prove that distinguishing the key stream generated by
XSYND from truly random sequence is reducible to solving an instance of regular word. Our proof is
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Figure 3.10.: The new functions g1
mainly based on Goldreich-Levin Theorem. In the practical part, we analyze the security of XSYND
faces the best known algorithms.
Theoretical Security. Our analysis is done in two steps. In the first step, we show that it is hard to
recover the secret state x given g1(x) and g2(x). More precisely, we show that inverting gi(x) is re-
ducible to the RSD problem. In the second step, we prove that XSYND is a pseudo-random generator,
meaning that the key stream produced by XSYND is indistinguishable from truly random sequences.
Step 1: We consider general transformations T defined as:
T (x) = a(<x1>α)1 ⊕a(<x2>α)2 ⊕·· ·⊕a(<xω>α)ω , ∀x = (x1, . . . ,xω) ∈ Fωα2 .
In this transformation, a( j)i for j = 0, . . . ,2
α is the ( j+ 1)th column of the ith submatrix Ai of a
random binary matrix A of size ωα×ω2α. Note that both g1 and g2 are particular instantiations of T ,
for random matrices A and B. Our argument in this step is as follows: we first show that (1) for each
x there exists a regular word z such that T (x) = A · z>, then prove that (2) learning x from y = T (x) is
equivalent to finding a regular word z such that A · z> = y (this is an instantiation of RSD(n, `,ω) for
`= ωα and n = ω2α). Thus, under the RSD assumption, the modified XSYND protocol security can
be reduced to the hardness of RSD.
First consider (1). We write A= A1| . . . |Aω as in the previous subsection, for ωα×2α submatrices
Ai. Each submatrix has columns a
(0)
i , . . . ,a
(2α−1)
i . We note that any regular word z is in fact a word
of length n = ω2α and weight ω, whose intger entries z1, . . . ,zω indicate the positions of its non-zero
entries (and each zi is a unique value between (i− 1)2b + 1 and i2b since the word is regular). Let
x′ = (x′1, . . . ,x
′
ω) be a state in decimal notation of the `-bit vector x, i.e., x
′
i =< xi >α for i = 1, · · · ,ω.
We associate each x′ with a value z whose decimal notation is (z1, . . . ,zω) for zi = (x′i+1)+(i−1)2α.
The reverse transformation of z to x′ is obtained as follows:
x′1 ≡ z1−1 (mod 2α)
x′2 ≡ z2−1 (mod 2α)
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
x′ω ≡ zω−1 (mod 2α)
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It is easy to check that:
A · z> = a(<x1>α)1 ⊕a(<x2>α)2 ⊕·· ·⊕a(<xω>α)ω = T (x).
Toy Example. Let us consider ω = 3 and α = 2. Then the matrix A should be (3 · 2)× (3 · 22) =
6×12 and binary. Consider in this example the following matrix A:
A=

a(0)1 a
(1)
1 a
(2)
1 a
(3)
1 a
(0)
2 a
(1)
2 a
(2)
2 a
(3)
2 a
(0)
3 a
(1)
3 a
(2)
3 a
(3)
3
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0

Let us consider a state x′ in decimal form, with x′ = (2,1,0), corresponding to x = [100100]. Com-
pute z in decimal form according to the formula zi = (x′i + 1)+ (i− 1)2α. Thus z1 = 3,z2 = 6, and
z3 = 9. In binary notation, zi denotes the positions of z’s non-zero entries, i.e. z = [0010|0100|1000].
We can now verify that for this z we have
T (x) = a(2)1 ⊕a(1)2 ⊕a(0)3 = [001111] = A · z>.
Now let us consider the security reduction of general transformations T to the RSD problem, i.e.
step (2) outlined above. We have shown that for each input value x we can find a regular word z of
weight ω such that A · z> = T (x). Assume that there exists an adversary that can invert T (x), i.e.
given y = g(x), the adversary outputs x. Then the same adversary computes z as above and can thus,
given a matrix A, and a value y = T (x) = A · z>, this adversary can output the regular word z. This
is exactly an instantiation of RSD(n, `,ω) for `= ωα and n = ω2α. In conclusion, we can reduce the
security of XSYND to the hardness of the RSD problem.
Step 2: In this step, we prove that XSYND is a pseudo-random generator. Our proof is an adaption
of that given for the Fischer-Stern’s PRNG [FS96]. We will show that if there exists an algorithm that
is able of distinguishing a random bit string from the output of the mapping x→ (g1(x),g2(x)), then
this algorithm can be converted into a predicator that can predicts the inner product of an input x and
a random bit string chosen at random. Before doing so, we state the following assumptions.
1. Indistinguishability (A1): The binary matrices A and B (both of size `×n) are computationally
indistinguishable from uniform matrices of the same dimensions.
2. Regular syndrome decoding (RSD) (A2): The family of mappings defined as gM(z) =M ·z> for
an uniform 2`× n binary matrix M is one-way on the set of all regular words of length n and
weight ω.
As shown before, the mapping x→ g1(x) (resp. x→ g2(x)) can be regarded as Fu(z) = A · z> (resp.
Fo(z) = B · z>), where A and B are binary matrices, both of size `×n, and z is taken from the set of
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regular words and related to the input x. Therefore, from now on, we will use Fu (resp. Fo) instead of
g1 (resp. g2).
From A and B we create a 2`×n block matrix M by stacking them vertically, i.e.
M=
(
A
B
)
In this case, we can write the mapping x → (g1(x),g2(x)) as gM(z) = M · z> = (Fu(z),Fo(z)).
Consequently, in order to prove that XSYND is a pseudo-random generator, it is sufficient to prove that
the output of z→ gM(z) is pseudo-random as proved in [FS96]. Our proof is based on the Goldreich-
Levin Theorem [GL89], which says that, for any one-way function, the inner product of its argument
and a randomly chosen bit string is a hardcore bit (or hardcore predicate). Recall that the inner product
of two bit strings a and b (of the same size) is defined by
〈a,b〉=∑
i
aibi mod 2.
Formally, this theorem can be stated as follows:
Theorem 3.3.1 (Goldreich-Levin theorem [GL89]). Let f : Fλ(n)2 → Fµ(n)2 be a one-way function. For
every PPT algorithm A , for all polynomials p and all but finitely many n’s,
Pr[A( f (x),ν) = 〈x,ν〉]≤ 1
2
+
1
p(n)
where the probability is taken over x uniformly chosen x and ν ∈ Fλ(n)2 .
Using this theorem we now prove that that XSYND is a pseudo-random generator.
Theorem 3.3.2. Suppose n, `, and ω are chosen such that the indistinguishability and the regular
syndrome decoding assumptions hold. Then the output distribution of XSYND is computationally
indistinguishable from a truly random distribution. That is, XSYND is a pseudo-random generator.
Proof. Our proof is by contradiction. Let us assume that an 2`-bit output of the mapping gM(z) =
M · z> is not pseudo-random, and there exists a distinguisher D , which is capable to differentiate this
output of from a 2`-bit random string υ. More precisely,D takes as input 2`×n binary random matrix
M and a random υ ∈ {0,1}2` as a candidate being equal to M · z> for some unknown regular word
z. In the event that M · z> = υ, D outputs 1 with probability above 12 + 1p(n) , for every polynomial
p(n). Otherwise, when υ is chosen uniformly from {0,1}2`, D outputs 1 with probability at most 12 .
Formally, the distinguisher D behaves as follows:
{
Pr[D(M,υ) = 1]≥ 12 + 1p(n) , if υ=M · z>, for some regular word z
Pr[D(M,υ) = 1]< 12 , if υ is taken uniformly from {0,1}2`
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As next step, we will build an algorithm P , which uses the distinguisher D as subroutine. This
algorithm will predicts the inner product 〈z,ν〉 with probability at least 12 + 12p(n) , where z is an un-
known regular word (an input of gM) and ν a randomly chosen n-bit string. To this end, let write
ν = (ν1, · · · ,νn). In addition, let σ be the number of the positions j such that where zi = ν j = 1, i.e.
the size of the intersection z∩ ν and ρ its parity, i.e. the inner product 〈z,ν〉. Then the algorithm P
takes as input gM(z) and ν and executes the following steps:
• Select a random ρ′ ∈ {0,1} as candidate to ρ
• Choose randomly ξ ∈ {0,1}2r
• Build a new 2`×n binary matrix M̂= (m̂1, · · · , m̂n) such that for every j ∈ {1, · · · ,n} it holds
m̂ j =
{
m j +ξ if ν j = 1,
m j if ν j = 0
• Feed the distinguisher with M̂ and gM(z)+ρ′ ·ξ
• If the distinguisher outputs 1, then output ρ′ = ρ. Otherwise, output the opposite of ρ′.
Now, we show next that P predicts the inner product 〈z,ν〉 with probability above 12 + 12p(n) . We
have to consider two events:
(1) E1:”ρ is guessed correctly”. Then the prognosticated value for the inner product 〈z,ν〉 is
correct if the distinguisher outputs 1. The distribution seen by the distinguisher on (M̂,gM(z)+
ρ′ ·ξ) is identical to the distribution on input (M,gM(z)). By construction, this is the case with
probability at least 12 +
1
p(n) .
(2) E2:”ρ is not guessed correctly”. The distinguisher receives uniformly distributed inputs
because of the randomness of ξ. It then returns 1 with probability 12 .
Since Pr[E1] = Pr[E2] = 12 , we conclude that the overall probability of correctly predicting the inner
product 〈z,ν〉 is at least 12 + 12p(n) . This contradicts the Theorem 3.3.1 because of the RSD assumption.
Practical Security This section presents what are provably the most generic attacks against XSYND.
We will only address the hardness of inverting the mapping T defined in the previous section, since
this is the main building block of XSYND design. If an attacker can invert T , then she can recover
the secret key and recover inner states.
In what follows, we denote by WFY (n, `,ω) the work factor (i.e. number of binary operations) required
to solve the instance RSD(n, `,ω) by using an algorithm Y . Furthermore, in estimating the complexity
of each attack against XSYND we use `= ωα with α= log2
( n
ω
)
.
There are essentially three types of known attacks that are applicable to XSYND:
1. Linearization Attacks. There are two types of linearization attacks that are relevant for XSYND,
namely the Bellare-Micciancio (BM) attack [BM97] against the XHASH function [BM97], and
the attack due to Saarinen [Saa07]. We discuss these attacks below.
(a) The Bellare-Micciancio’s attack (BM). This is a preimage attack proposed by Bellare and
Micciancio [BM97] against the so-called XHASH mapping. This attack relies on finding a
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linear dependency among ω `-bit vectors, where ω is the number of vectors XORred together
and `, the length (in bits) of the target value. This is likely to succeed if the value ω is close
to `. More precisely, let l and k be two positive integers. Let f be a random function with
f : Fl2 7→ F`2. Let [i] denote the binary representation of an integer i. Based on f , the XHASH
mapping is defined as
XHASH(x) = f ([1]|x1)⊕·· ·⊕ f ([ω]|xω), with x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xω).
The BM attack finds a preimage x of a given z = XHASH(x) ∈ F`2 as follows. First, one finds
ω-bit string y = (y1, . . . ,yω), with yi ∈ F2, such that XHASH(xy) = z, where xy = xy11 . . .xyωω . To
achieve this, one first computes 2ω values βki = f ([i]|x ji ) for k ∈ {0,1} and i ∈ {1, . . . ,ω}; the
next step is to try to solve the following system of equations over F2 using linear algebra:{
yi⊕ y¯i = 1, i ∈ {1, . . . ,ω},
⊕ωi=1β0i ( j)yi⊕β1i ( j)y¯i = z(i), j ∈ {1, . . . , `}.
Here, β0i ( j) (resp. β1i ( j) ) denotes the j−th bit of β0i (resp. β1i ) and y¯i = 1−yi are the unknowns.
This system has `+ω equations in 2w unknowns and is easy to solve when w = r+ 1. More
generally, it was shown in [BM97] that for all y ∈ Fω2 the probability to have XHASH(xy) 6= z
is at most 2`−ω. That is, the complexity of inverting XHASH is at least 2`−ω; in our notation,
WFBM(n, `,ω)≥ 2`−ω = 2(α−1)ω.
(b) The Saarinen’s attack (SA). This attack is due to Saarinen [Saa07] and it was proposed
against the FSB [AFS05] hash function. The main idea behind this attack is reducing the prob-
lem of finding collisions or preimages to that of solving systems of equations. This attack is
very efficient when ` < 2ω. We briefly show how this attack works in our setting, where we
must invert the map T .
As shown in section 5.1, T (x) = A · z>, where A is the random binary matrix of size `× n,
whose entries define T , and z is a regular word of length n and weight ω. We can in turn write
A · z> out as follows:
y =⊕ωi=1a(i−1) nω+xi+1, 0≤ xi ≤
n
ω
, (3.10)
where x = (x1, . . . ,xω) and a j denotes the j−th column of A. For simplicity, assume that xi ∈
{0,1}. In this case, we define a constant `-bit vector c and an additional `×ω binary matrix H
as follows.
c =⊕ωi=1a(i−1) nω+1, A= [b1 · · ·bω] with bi = a(i−1) nω+1⊕a(i−1) nω+2. (3.11)
It is easy to check that y = B · x+ c. As a consequence if ` = ω, then H is square and we can
find the preimage x from y as:
x = B−1 · (y⊕ c), (3.12)
where B−1 denotes the inverse of H. Note that this inverse exists with probability without proof
of ∏`i=1(1−1/2i)≈ 0.29 for ` moderately large. The expected complexity of this attack is the
the workload of inverting H, which is al most 0.29 · `3. It has been proved in [Saa07] that the
same complexity is obtained even if `≤ 2ω.
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In the opposite direction, Saarinen also extended his attack for the case when ω ≤ `/θ for
θ > 1 and xi /∈ {0,1}. In this case, the complexity is about 2`/(θ+ 1)w. Moreover, the recent
result [BLPS11b] shows that if θ = 2β, for β > 1, this complexity becomes 2`/(β+ 1)2ω. As
consequence we obtain:
WFSA(n, `,ω)≥
{
2`/(θ+1)ω if ω≤ `/θ
2r/(θ+1)2ω if ω≤ `/2θ
which can be rewritten in our setting as:
WFSA(n, `,ω)≥
{
( 2
α
θ+1)
ω if θ≤ α
( 2
α
(θ+1)2 )
ω if θ≤ α/2
2. Generalized Birthday Attacks (GBA). This class of attacks attempt to solve the following,
so-called k-sum problem: given k random lists L1,L2, . . . ,Lk of `-bit strings selected uniformly
and independently at random, find x1 ∈ L1,x2 ∈ L2, . . . ,xk ∈ Lk such that ⊕ki=1xi = 0. For k = 2,
a solution can be found in time 2`/2 using the standard birthday paradox. For k> 2 Wagner’s al-
gorithm [Wag02] and its extended variants [AFS05, Ber07, MS09, FS09] can be applied. When
k = 2 j−1 and |Li|> 2`/ j, Wagner’s algorithm can find at least one solution in time 2`/ j.
Let us explain the main idea behind a GBA algorithm for k = 4. Let L1, . . . ,L4 be four lists,
each of length 2`/3. The algorithm proceeds in two iterations. In the first iteration, we build
two new lists L1,2 and L3,4. The list L1,2 contains all sums x1⊕x2 with x1 ∈ L1 and x2 ∈ L2 such
that the first `/3 bits of the sum are zero. Similarly, L3,4 contains all sums x3⊕ x4 with x3 ∈ L3
and x4 ∈ L4 such that the first `/3 bits of the sum are zero. So the expected length of L1,2 is
equal to 2−`/3 · |L1| · |L2|= 2`/3. Similarly, the expected length of L3,4 is also 2`/3. In the second
iteration of the algorithm, we construct a new list L′1 containing all pairs (x
′
1,x
′
2) ∈ L1,2×L3,4
such that the first `/3 bits of the sum x′1⊕ x′2 are zero. Then the probability that x′1⊕ x′2 equals
zero is 2−2`/3. Therefore, the expected number of matching sums is 2−2`/3 · |L1,2| · |L3,4|= 1. So
we expected to find a solution. This idea can be generalized for k = 2 j−1 by repeating the same
procedure j−2 times. In each iteration a, we construct lists, each containing 2`/ j elements that
are zero on their first a`/ j bits, until obtaining, on average, one `-bit element with all entries
equal to 0.
We estimate the security of XSYND against GBA attacks by using the GBA algorithm from [FS09].
This algorithm attempts to find a set of indices I = {1,2, · · · ,2γ} satisfying⊕i∈IHi = 0, whereHi
are columns of the matrix H. As shown in [FS09], the algorithm is applicable when
( 2αω
2(1−γ)ω
)≥
2αω+γ(γ−1). Under this condition, the cost of solving an instance RSD problem with parameters
(n, `,ω) is given by:
WFGBA(n, `,ω)≥
(
ωα
γ −1
)
2
ωα
γ −1.
Note that the recent result in [NCB11] shows that the time and memory efficiency of GBA at-
tacks can be improved, but only by a small factor. This improvement is taken into account when
proposing parameters for XSYND in the following subsection.
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3. Information Set Decoding (ISD). ISD is one of the most important generic algorithm for de-
coding errors in an arbitrary linear code. An ISD algorithm consists (in its simplest form) in
finding a valid, so-called information set, which is a subset of k error-free positions amongst
the n positions of each codeword. Here, k is the dimension and n the length of the code. The
validity of this set is checked by using Gaussian elimination on the `×n parity check matrix H.
If we denote by p(n, `,ω) the probability of finding a valid information set and by c(`) the cost
of Gaussian elimination, then the overall cost of ISD algorithms equals the ratio c(r)/p(n, `,ω).
In the following, we estimate the cost of finding a solution to the regular syndrome decoding
(RSD) problem, i.e. we wish to invert the map T . Let ns(n, `,ω) be the expected number of
solutions of RSD instance. This quantity is:
ns(n, `,ω) =
( n
ω
)w
2`
= 1,
because `=ω log2( nω). In addition, let pv(n, `,ω) be the probability that a given information set
is valid for one given solution of RSD. As shown in [AFS05], p(n, `,ω) can be approximated
by: p(n, `,ω)≈ pv(n, `,ω) ·ns(n, `,ω).
Furthermore, as shown in [AFS05], pv(n, `,ω) is given by:
pv(n, `,ω) =
( r
n
)ω
=
(
log2(n/w)
n/ω
)ω
We thus conclude that the probability of selecting a valid set to invert RSD is equal to: p(n, `,ω)=( α
2α
)ω.
Hence, the cost WFISD(n, `,ω) of solving an instance of RSD with parameters (n, `,ω) is approx-
imately:
WFISD(n, `,ω)≈ c(`) ·
(
2α
α
)ω
. (3.13)
If we assume that the complexity of Gaussian elimination is `3, then WFISD(n, `,ω) becomes:
WFISD(n, `,ω)≈ (ωα)3 ·
(
2α
α
)ω
. (3.14)
In practice, we use the lower bound for ISD algorithms presented in [MMT11] to estimate the
security of XSYND faces ISD attacks and show our results in Table 3 .
Remark 3.3.1. One could also use Time Memory trade-off attacks against stream ciphers. This
attack was first introduced in [Hel80] as a generic method of attacking block ciphers. To make
this attack unfeasible, one must adjust the cipher parameters as shown in [Gol97, HS05], i.e.,
the initial vector should be at least as large as the key, and the state should be at least twice the
key.
Table 3 briefly summarizes the expected complexity of the previous attacks against XSYND.
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Attack The binary logarithm of the complexity: log2(WF(.)(n, `,ω))
with `= ωα and n = ω2α
BM ω(α−1)
SA
{
ω(α− log2(θ+1)), if θ≤ α
ω(α−2log2(θ+1)), if θ≤ α/2
GBA ωα/γ+ log2(ωα/γ−1)−1 for γ ∈ N
ISD ω(α− log2(α))+3log2(ωα)
Table 3.5.: The estimated complexities of possible attacks against XSYND.
3.3.3. Parameters and Experimental Results
Taking into account all the previous attacks against XSYND, we select ’optimal’ parameters
that offer both a desired level of security and a satisfying efficiency. First, we choose `= 2|IV |
and |IV | = |K| to avoid the Time Memory Trade-Off attacks according [Gol97, HS05]. For
efficiency reasons we then fix α = log2(n/ω) = 8 and for each security level λ we vary ω to
obtain both high performance and a complexity of solving the RSD problem of at least 2λ.
We have tested a large set of potential parameters for a number of security levels. Table 3.6
presents the optimal parameter sets (n, `,ω) resulted from running our implementation for sev-
eral security levels. Note that in our implementation, we only use random binary codes without
any particular structure. But it is possible to find parameters providing the same security levels
when the parity check matrix is quasi-cyclic as in [GLS07]. In this case, ` has to be a prime
and 2 is primitive root of the finite field F∗r in order to guarantee the randomness property of
quasi-cyclic codes as demonstrated in [GZ07].
Table 3.6.: Proposed parameters for XSYND.
Security Level n ` ω Key/IV size Speed of XSYND
(bits) (cycles/byte)
90 8192 256 32 128 14.92
120 12288 384 48 192 16.98
160 16384 512 64 256 35.40
200 20480 640 80 320 43.68
240 24576 768 96 384 55.42
280 28672 896 112 448 77.09
The results shown in Table 3.6 are for a pure C/C++ implementation with additional use of
C/C++-Intrinsics). The operating system was Debian 6.0.3, the source has been compiled with
gcc (Debian 4.4.5-8) 4.4.5. All results have been gained on an AMD Phenom(tm) 9950 Quad-
Core Processor, running at a clock rate of 1300 MHz. Due to the row-major convention of
C/C++, the two matrices A resp. B have been used and stored in transposed form. In order to
compare the speed of XSYND with the claimed speed of SYND [GLS07] and 2SC [MCY11]
(Table 3.8), we have tested our implementation using the parameter sets suggested in [GLS07].
Our results presented in Table 3.7 show that, for comparable security levels (90 and 250),
XSYND runs faster than SYND [GLS07] and 2SC cipher [CSM], but its speed is compara-
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Figure 3.11.: The behavior of speed of XSYND in function of security level.
ble to that of 2SC for 170-bit security.
Security Level n ` ω key/IV size speed of SYND speed of XSYND
(bits) (cycles/byte) (cycles/byte)
[GLS07] — [CSM]
90 8192 256 32 128 27 — 30.27 14.92
170 8192 512 64 256 53 — 41.05 35.18
250 8192 1024 128 512 83 — 149.94 55.69
Table 3.7.: Performance of XSYND compared to that of SYND using the same parameters in [GLS07].
Table 3.8.: Parameters and performance of 2SC cipher given in [CSM].
Security Level n ` ω key/IV size Speed
(bits) (cycles/byte)
90 1572864 384 24 144 25.12
170 2228224 544 34 208 33.22
250 3801088 928 58 352 80.05
3.4. The PSYND Cipher
3.4.1. Motivation
From the description of the XSYND stream cipher and its original variant XSYND, it is straight-
forward to see that for producing a key stream block of SYND, the mapping g2 first has to wait for
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Figure 3.12.: Speed comparison between SYND , 2SC and XSYND.
function evaluation of g1 every time. This a bottleneck of this two schemes, because it makes the
whole process not fully parallelizable using the state-of-the art programming techniques. The main
purpose of this section is to show how to design a SYND-like stream cipher that can be completely
implemented in a parallel manner, and hence has better computationally features than the XSYND
stream cipher, and can be furthermore shown to be provably secure at the same time.
3.4.2. Description of the PSYND cipher
In this subsection we provide a detailed description of the PSYND cipher and its basic ingredients.
The letters in its name stand for ”Parallel SYND”.
As in XSYSND and SYND, the PSYND is a synchronous stream cipher and parameterized by a
set of positive integers (n, `,ω) satisfying ` = ωα, where ω < ` < n, and α = log(n/ω). This set de-
termines the size of an internal state, the key length, and the size of an initial vector (IV). For security
reasons, the IV has the same length as the secret key, both have `/2 bits. The PSYND is composed
of two major blocks, Initializer, and Generator, both implicitly use two transformations G1 and
G2 that are similar to the mappings g1 and g2 of the XSYND stream cipher, respectively. (See Fig-
ure 3.10).
Initializer: F : F|K|2 ×F|IV |2 → F`2×F`2.
It takes as input the initialize vector IV and the key K in order to calculate the initial state s0 = (x0,y0),
according the following steps:
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
λ= K‖IV
β= λ⊕G1(λ)
γ= λ⊕G2(λ)
F(λ) = (β⊕G2(β),γ⊕G1(γ)) = (x0,y0) = s0
During the initialization stage no output bits are returned, only after s0 is produced, keystream
generation is allowed to take place. A graphical illustration of F is presented in Figure 3.13.
Figure 3.13.: Block diagram of Initializer F
Generator: G : F`2×F`2→ F`2×F`2.
It takes as input the initial state s0 generated by F , and produces an 2`-bit string (ui,vi), i≥ 1 in each
round. A simple block diagram of this generator is shown in Figure 3.14.
The creation of {si+1}i≥0 works as follows. Starting with si = (xi,yi), the generator G outputs (ui,vi)
and updates si (or computes the subsequent state si+1 = (xi+1,yi+1)) by executing the following com-
putations (in parallel):
xi+1← φ1(xi) and yi+1← φ2(yi) (STEP 1) (3.15)
vi← φ2(xi) and ui← φ1(yi) (STEP 2) (3.16)
During this process, only ui and vi are returned as output and made visible to an adversary.
Note that G1 and G2 are called at the same time with different inputs, so that the implementation of
G can be fitted to the parallelism of modern CPUs. The whole process of the keystream generation of
PSYND can be described by a single function h that takes as input a 2`-bit string and expands it into
a 4`-bit string in each iteration. This function is defined as follows:
h(x,y) := f(x,y)‖g(x,y) ∈ F4`2 , (3.17)
where (x,y)→ f(x,y) := (G1(x),G2(y)) is a update function, that refreshes the current state (x,y),
while (x,y)→ g(x,y) := (G1(y),G2(x)) is an output function producing an 2`-bit string which form
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Figure 3.14.: Diagrammatic representation of the PSYND’s Generator G
the keystream bits of PSYND.
3.4.3. Security of the cipher
The security of PSYND is discussed. More precisely, we will prove that the PSYND is a pseudo-
random generator. Then we analyze its security from practical point of view by identifying all the
best known attacks that can applicable against it.
Theoretical security. Here we will prove that the PSYND is a pseudo-random generator under the
assumptions made in the previous section, namely the indistinguishability and RSD assumption. In
order to prove that, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.4.1. If the assumption A2 holds, then the transformations G1 and G2 defined in PSYND are
one-way.
Proof. To prove this Lemma, it is sufficient to show that G1 (and G2) can be transformed into a
function selected from the collection defined in A2. This claim has been proved in subsection 3.3.2.
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Lemma 3.4.2. If the assumption A2 holds, then the transformations f and g are both one-way.
Proof. This straightforward results from [GIL+90, Yao82b], that state that for every collection of
one-way functions F = { fk}k∈S, where S is a finite set, the collection Fn = { fi1,··· ,in}i1,··· ,in∈Sn , whose
elements are defined as fi1,··· ,in(x1, · · · ,xn) = ( fi1(x1), · · · , fin(xn)) is also one-way. In addition, this is
even true when having a single mapping (i.e., when i1 = · · ·= in). In our setting, we have S = {1,2}.
For proving the pseudo-randomness of the key stream produced by PSYND, we will prove that the
sequence pair (ui,vi) is pseudo-random, meaning that it is indistinguishable from an 2`-bit random
string. We will do this by induction. Before doing this, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4.1. Let R and L be two functions defined over F`2 by
R(x) = G1(x)‖G2(x) and L(y) = G2(y)‖G1(y)
Related to R and L, we define two 2`-bit strings generator GR and GL depicted in Figure 3.15 and
Figure 3.16, respectively.
Figure 3.15.: Illustration of GR Figure 3.16.: Illustration of GL
The function G1 (resp. G2) is the update (resp. output) function of GR contrary to GL.
If the assumptions A1 and A2 hold, then GR and GL are both pseudo-random generators.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove this statement for GR, since they are similar. The proof is similar to that
of XSYND (Theorem 3.3.2. Note that R and is L are both expansion functions with expansion factor
2`.
As shown earlier the functions G1 (resp. G2) can be rewritten as G1(x) = A · z> (resp. G2(x) = B · z>),
where z is a regular word that corresponds to the input x. Hence, if we vertically stack A and B, we
obtain a new 2`×n matrix M given by
M=
(
A
B
)
.
This matrix satisfies assumption A1. By doing so, we can write R(x) = M · z>. So, it would be
sufficient to prove that the output of M · z> is pseudo-random. Now, we show by contradiction that the
output of R is pseudo-random. Suppose the opposite. Then there is a distinguisher Ψ that can make a
distinction between this output and an 2`-bit random sequence u. This distinguisher accepts as input
an 2`×n binary random matrix A and a random u ∈ {0,1}2` as a candidate being equal to M · z> for
some unknown regular word z. If M · z> = u, Ψ outputs 1 with probability above 12 + 1p(n) , for every
polynomial p(n). Otherwise, when u is chosen uniformly from {0,1}2`, Ψ outputs 1 with probability
at most 12 .
More precisely, the behavior of Ψ is the following:
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{
Pr[Ψ(M,u) = 1]≥ 12 + 1p(n) , if u =M · z>, for some regular word z
Pr[Ψ(M,u) = 1]< 12 , if u is taken uniformly from {0,1}2`
Our next step is to construct an algorithm Θ which calls Ψ as a subroutine, in order to predict
the dot product of unknown regular word z and a random chosen η-bit sequence v (i.e., 〈z,v〉) with
probability at least 12 +
1
2p(n) . To achieve this, we write v = (v1, · · · ,vη) and define pi to be the number
of the positions j such that zi = v j = 1, i.e. the size of the intersection z∩v. Let σ be its parity, i.e. the
inner product 〈z,v〉. By doing so, on inputs M · z> and v, the algorithm Θ will perform the following:
• Choose a random σ′ ∈ {0,1} as candidate to σ
• Choose randomly δ ∈ {0,1}2`
• Construct a new 2`×n binary matrix M̂= (â1, · · · , ân) such that for every j ∈ {1, · · · ,n} it holds
â j =
{
a j +δ if v j = 1,
a j if v j = 0
where (a1, · · · ,aη) is the decomposition of M.
• Supply the distinguisher Ψ with M̂ and M · z>+σ′ ·δ
• If Ψ outputs 1, then outputs σ′ = σ. Otherwise, returns the opposite of σ′.
We now show that Θ predicts the dot product 〈z,v〉 with probability above 12 + 12p(n) .
There are to distinct cases to treat:
(1) C1:= {σ guessed correctly}. Then the predicted value for 〈z,v〉 is correct if the distinguisher
outputs 1. But the distribution seen by the distinguisher on (M̂,M · z>+σ′ ·δ) is similar to the
distribution on input (M,M · z>). By construction, this occurs with probability at least 12 + 1p(n) .
(2) C2:= {σ not guessed correctly}. The distinguisher receives uniformly distributed inputs be-
cause of the randomness of δ and therefore outputs 1 with probability 12 .
Seeing that Pr[C1] = Pr[C2] = 12 , we can conclude that the entire success probability of predicting
the dot product 〈z,v〉 is at least 12 + 12p(n) . This leads to a contradiction with the Goldreich-Levin
Theorem [GL89] due to assumption A2. As consequence, the function R (and also L) is pseudo-
random.
Now we are ready to present the main result concerning the pseudo-randomness of the PSYND
stream cipher. The proof is inductive over the iteration number and involves Theorem 3.4.1.
Theorem 3.4.2. If we choose parameters (n, `,ω) such that assumptions A1 and A3 are met, then the
PSYND cipher is a pseudo-random generator.
Proof. To this end, we will show that the sequences ui and vi are pseudo-random. We will prove this
by induction over i.
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• Base case : i = 1. From Theorem 3.4.1 we conclude that R(x0) = G1(x0)‖G2(x0) and L(y0) =
G2(y0)‖G1(y0) are both 2`-bit pseudo-random sequence. This implies also u0 = G2(x0) and
v0 = G1(y0) are pseudo-random sequence. The same argument holds for x1 = G1(x0) and y1 =
G2(y0).
• Induction step: Assume that u j and v j (and also x j and y j ) are pseudo-random sequences for
some positive integer j (the induction hypothesis). We will show that u j+1 and v j+1 are also
pseudo-random sequences. We have the following relations:{
ui+1 = G1(yi+1), y j+1 = G2(y j)
vi+1 = G2(xi+1), x j+1 = G1(x j)
By the induction hypothesis, the sequences R(x j) = G1(x j)‖G2(x j) and L(y j) = G2(y j)‖G1(y j) are
pseudo-random. That means, G1(x j) = x j+1 and G2(y j) = y j+1 are pseudo-random and applying
Theorem 3.4.1 on these sequences completes the inductive step and therefore the PSYND cipher is a
pseudo-random number generator.
After proving the pseudorandomness of the key stream of the PSYND stream cipher, we now want
to discuss the security of the initialization process.
Security of the initialization process. We will prove that the probability of recovering the secret
key is negligible. As described before, the generation of the initial state s0 = (x0,y0) of PSYND is
done as follows:

λ= K‖IV
β= λ⊕G1(λ)
γ= λ⊕G2(λ)
F(λ) = (β⊕G2(β),γ⊕G1(γ)) = (x0,y0) = s0
Assume that one can somehow know the initial state s0. So, to recover the secret key and IV, one has
to solve the following equations:
x0 = β⊕G2(β) with β= λ⊕G1(λ) (3.18)
y0 = γ⊕G1(γ) with γ= λ⊕G2(λ) (3.19)
To do this, it is sufficient to solve the equations
x′ = x⊕G2(x), (3.20)
y′ = y⊕G1(y), (3.21)
where x′ and y′ are both known, while x and y are unknown variables. As shown before, G2 and
G1 produce pseudo-random outputs for random inputs. That means, that the variables x and y are also
pseudo-random. For the sake of simplicity, one can suppose that x′ = 0 and y′ = 0. In this case, the
equations (6) and (7) become
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x⊕G2(x) = 0, (3.22)
y⊕G1(y) = 0, (3.23)
As a result, to solve this system one has to find fixed points for the transformations G1 and G2. But,
what is the success probability for finding such points. In order to estimate this probability, we use
the following result, which is known as the Piling-Up Lemma [Mat94].
Lemma 3.4.3. For each value (1≤ i≤ t), let Zi be a random variable over {0,1}, independent of Z j
for all j 6= i, such that
Pr(Zi = 1) = pi, ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , t}
Pr(Zi = 0) = 1− pi
Then Pr(Z1⊕Z2⊕·· ·⊕Zt = 0) = 12 +2t−1∏ti=1(pi− 12)
The equation (3.23) can be rewritten as XORing of ω+1 unknown `-bit strings, whose sum equals
0. Thus if x is randomly chosen from F`2, then the probability that it is a fixed point for G2 is equal to
1
2
`. Actually, the row entries of the underlying matrix of G2 and x can be associated to independent
random variables (Z( j)i ) defined over {0,1}, where i∈{1, · · · ,ω+1} and j∈{1, · · · , `} are the column
and row positions, respectively. With this setting, we have Pr[Z( j)i = 1] = pi =
1
2 . Using Lemma 3.4.3
we obtain
Pr(φ2(x) = x) =
`
∏
i=1
Pr(Z( j)1 ⊕Z( j)2 · · ·⊕Z( j)ω+1) =
1
2`
. (3.24)
Thus for a large value of ` , this probability is negligible. In PSYND the value of ` is at least 128.
Practical security. To asses the security of the PSYND family from practical point of view, this
paragraph briefly describes the best known generic algorithms for attacking PSYND, but focuses only
on attacks that aim at recovering the secret key or internal states. Key or state recovery in PSYND can
be done by inverting the underlying functions G1 and G2 involved in the initialization and key stream
generation procedure, as they constitute the major components of PSYND’s desing.
Best known attacks: to our best knowledge, there basically exist three different potential algorithms:
Linearisation Attacks (LA), Generalized Birthday Attacks (GBA), and Information Set Decoding
(ISD). All these attacks have been described earlier in subsection 3.3.2.
Other type of attacks: Here we discuss some other attacks that could be applicable against the
PSYND stream cipher.
Exhaustive key search. It is the simplest attack against any cipher and consists in trying every possible
key in turn until the correct key is found. However, this attack do not seem to be applicable against
PSYND due to the large cardinality of the key space. The key length used in PSYND is at least to 128
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bits.
Guess-and-Determine attacks. The basic idea of this kind of attacks is try to find the value of un-
knowns variables in a cipher by guessing some of them and deducing another from the guessed un-
knowns variables. Let us demonstrate how this attack can be applied against PSYND. Assume that IV
is known, that is ω2 selected columns of the whole matrix of size ωα×ω2α are known. Suppose that an
adversary aims at attacking the initialization phase of PSYND for recovering the secret key. Assume
that she can only guess uα bits of the secret key and the remaining ω2α bits are still unknown. Those
bits correspond to ω2 − u unknown columns, each of them has length ` bits. Thus, the complexity to
recover the secret key is `
ω
2−u binary operations. For example, for the instance PSYND(8192,256,32),
this attack requires 2120 bops if only 8 bits of the secret key are successfully guessed.
Time-memory trade-off attacks. A time-memory tradeoffs attack, originally presented by Hellman
in [Hel80], is applicable when the state size of the cipher is too small. As pointed out in [Gol97,
HS05], the TMTA can be avoided by taking the following conditions into account: the initial value
should be at least as large as the key, and the state should be at least twice the key. The PSYND’s
parameters proposed in the next section fulfil this condition. If one allows the precomputation com-
plexity to be greater than the complexity of exhaustive key search, it is possible to get a time-memory
trade-off attack which is faster than exhaustive key search. This is valid for any type of stream cipher.
Dieharder tests. Dieharder tests∗, developed by G. Marsaglia, is a set of statistical tests designed
to examine the randomness of random numbers. These tests were performed on the internale state
(including the initial state) as well as on the output of the PSYND cipher. As a result, PSYND seems
to behave as a true random number generator, as it passes successfully all tests in the Dieharder suite.
3.4.4. Parameters and experimental results
Some implementation details The PSYND stream cipher has been implemented using C/C++ pro-
gramming language. The implementation employs the intrinsic functions and the underlying matrices
have been generated using the system time as a seed. For our tests we used an Intel Core 2 Duo E8400,
running at a clock frequency of 3.0 GHz. It has L1 cache size of 2 × 32 KB for the data caches, and
a L2 cache size of 6 MB. The sources have been compiled with gcc, version 4.6.1, and the tests have
be carried out under Linux Ubuntu 6.10. For each test run, we load the matrices A and B from a file
and generate the initial state. At the moment, we used a fixed key K and a fixed initial vector IV . For
each iteration of the output phase the indices of the XORed columns are unknown a priori. Therefore,
our scheme has difficulty to take advantage particularly of the L1 cache. The probability that cache
lines can be reused is quite low, which is also confirmed by our results. The bigger the matrices A and
B become, the more the advantages of the L1 cache get lost. In order to overcome this problem, we
executed the two output steps in parallel. For the implementation of threads, we used the pthread li-
brary. Each output step has been represented by its own thread. Thereby we create two output streams
which can then be used by the application.
∗http://www.phy.duke.edu/ rgb/General/dieharder.php
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Parameters choice The PSYND’s parameters should be selected with great caution as bad choice
could considerably affect the speed and the security of the system. By construction, the main pa-
rameters are α and ω due to the relations n = ω2α and n = ωα. Smaller ω offer good performance,
and larger α increase security and therefore controlling these two parameters allows for obtaining an
optimal efficiency–security tradeoff curve. According to this rule, the choice of α and ω in our imple-
mentation meets the following constraints: α is equal to 8, and ω is a multiple of 16, allowing ` to be
a multiple of 32 (or 64 depending on the CPU architecture) for a full use of the word-size XORs.
Experimental results Putting all of the above conditions together, we found a large set of parame-
ters (n, `,ω) providing a high performance using different key/IV size and offering required security
levels. Table 3.9 presents some ”optimal” parameters sets (n, `,ω) in which we give the provided
security level, and the size of the secret key K and the initial vector IV . The security is estimated
according to best known attacks described earlier.
security n ` ω K/IV size speed (cpb)
90 8192 256 32 128 9.43
128 12288 384 48 192 12.09
180 16384 512 64 256 16.84
300 20480 640 80 320 29.92
400 24576 768 96 768 41.8
Table 3.9.: Some parameters for the PSYND cipher.
Comparison with XSYND. Here we want to compare the PSYND cipher with the XSYND ci-
pher [MHC12]. The comparison is done in terms of the speed and the storage requirements. The speed
is measured in cycles per byte (cpb), while the storage space in bits. The data comparison results are
summarized in Table 3.10 and plotted in Figure 3.17. As one can deduce from this table, the PSYND
outperforms XSYND in terms of performance. For instance, PSYND(8192,256,32) runs much faster
than XSYND(8192,256,32), for the same security level of 90 bits. As mentioned in [GLS07], adding
of the quasi-cyclic structure in the matrices of PSYND, could significantly improve the PSYND sys-
tem in terms storage space, since the required space amount (in bits) to be stored equals n instead
of n` bits. This modification however could worsen the performance and threaten the security of the
system, despite the pseudo-randomness property of quasi-cyclic codes satisfying some constraints on
parameters [GZ07]. For that reasons, we did not implement this kind of codes in the PSYND family.
Comparison with the eSTREAM candidates. The eSTREAM portfolio contains 7 ciphers, 4 of
them are software-oriented stream ciphers (profile 1): HC-128, Rabbit, Salsa 20/12, and SOSE-
MANUK. A detailed description of these ciphers can be found in the eSTREAM book [RB08]. Ta-
ble 3.11 summarizes some data about these stream-ciphers including the key/IV size and the perfor-
mance. These data were reported in the Bernstein’s eSTREAM benchmarking paper [Ber]. The speed
measurements were performed on a computer possessing a four-core 2394MHz Intel Core 2 Quad
Q6600 6fb processor. As one can deduce from this table, the PSYND familiy is much slower than
these proposals. For instance, HC-128 supporting 128-bit key and 128-bit IV and offering 128-bit
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scheme parameters key/IV size speed estimated security
(n, `,ω) (bits) (cpb)
XSYND
(8192,256,32) 128 14.92 90
(12288,384,48) 192 16.98 128
(16384,512,64) 256 35.40 160
(20480,640,80) 320 43.68 200
(24576,768,96) 384 55.42 240
PSYND
(8192,256,32) 128 9.43 90
(12288,384,48) 192 12.09 128
(16384,512,64) 256 16.84 160
(20480,640,80) 320 29.92 200
(24576,768,96) 384 41.8 240
Table 3.10.: Performance comparison of PSYND with XSYND for the same security levels.
Figure 3.17.: Graphical comparison between XSYND and PSYND in terms of speed for the same
security levels.
security, runs with a speed of 2.34 cpb, while PSYND(8192,256,32) runs at 9.43 cpb and but only pro-
vides 90-bit security. However, compared to the 128-bit AES-CTR running at 12.59 cpb, the instance
PSYND(12288,384,48) with a key and IV of 192 bit, delivers the same performance.
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Primitive key size IV size speed (cpb)
HC-128 128 128 2.34
Rabbit 128 64 2.34
Salsa 20/12 128 64 2.54
SOSEMANUK 128 64 3.54
AES-CTR 128 128 12.59
PSYND 128 128 9.43
Table 3.11.: Performance of some software-oriented eSTREAM’s candidates, as reported in [Ber].
3.5. Conclusion and Open Problems
Starting from the Fischer-Stern pseudo-random number generator, we have describe three code-based
constructions of stream ciphers and shown how to improve the efficiency the existing ones. First, we
showed how to use the sponge construction to design a stream cipher, called 2SC. This runs much
faster than the SYND stream cipher, but it uses larger matrices than SYND. Then, we propose the
XSYND cipher as an improved variant of SYND in terms of performance. XSYND uses a generic
state transformation which is directly reducible to the regular syndrome decoding problem, but has
better computational characteristics than the regular encoding introduced in the SYND system. Fur-
thermore, we deliver a security proof for XSYND, which shows that if there exist a distinguisher for
XSYND, there exist a solver that can solve a hard instance of the regular syndrome decoding. In the
last section of this chapter, we showed how to parallelize the XSYND in order to double the output
size and hence increase further its performance leading to a new construction, called PSYND. This
cipher outperforms all previous constructions. For instance, for 80 bit security, the PSYND with 128
bits key size runs at 9.43 cycles per byte, while the original proposal SYND only runs at 36 cycles
per bytes, both use the same parameter set. However, despite its security reduction to the RSD prob-
lem, its efficiency is unfortunately incomparable to that of the software-oriented candidates (profile
1) from the eSTREAM project. As future work, we suggest a hardware implementation of PSYND
to see whether the performance can be further improved and to make a comparison with profile 2 of
eSTREAM project.
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Chapter 4
Code-based Hash Functions
This chapter investigates the design of hash functions based on the SD problem. We first start by
describing the Fast Syndrome Based hash [AFS05, FGS07, AFG+08] family (FSB) and recalling its
main features in Section 4.2. Then, we present in Section 4.3 our main contribution, which con-
sists in showing how to incorporate the ideas of FSB and the sponge construction due to Bertoni et
al. [BDPA07] to design a variant of FSB hash function, called Sponge-FSB (in short S-FSB). The
security of this variant is based on the same problems as FSB, and discussed in Subsection 4.3.2,
while the proposed parameters and our implementation results are given in Subsection 4.3.3. Finally,
we describe the RFSB hash function, which is another variant of FSB and provide the reported results
according to the available RFSB implementations.
4.1. Introduction
As defined in Chapter 2, a cryptographic hash function satisfying certain security properties, plays an
important role in many cryptographic applications such as digital signatures, pass-word protection and
pseudo-random number generation. Over last years, a long list of hash functions have been proposed
in the literature. Following cryptanalytical advances, most of them widely used in practice such as
SHA-1 [EJ01] have been found to be insecure [CR06, WYY05]. This has called into question the
long-term security of later algorithms that share a similar design like SHA-2 family [Nat08]. As a
reaction, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a publicly available con-
test, called SHA-3 (or the Advanced Hash Standard (AHS)), to develop new family of hash functions.
Initially, 64 candidates have been submitted following different design principles, and only 14 of the
competing designs were selected in the second round of the contest. One of the submissions that
did not pass to this round, was the Fast Syndrome-Based hash function , which we describe in the
subsequent section.
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4.2. Fast Syndrome Based Hash Family
4.2.1. Description of FSB hash familiy.
In 2003, Augot et al. [AFS03] introduced the Syndrome-Based hash family (in short SB), which
iterates a so called compression function according to Merkle-Damga˚rd’s design principle [Mer89,
Dam89] (MD). The SB is the first hash function which uses binary random codes and has security
reduction to NP-complete problems from coding theory. At Mycrypt 2005, Augot et al. [AFS05]
proposed an improved variant of SB, called Fast Syndrome-Based hash family (in short FSB), in
terms of speed by introducing the so-called regular encoder that convert a bit string of certain length
into a regular word. In 2007, Finiasz et al. [FGS07] showed how to increase the FSB’s efficiency in
two ways: (1) adding a final compression transformation in order to obtain a desired hash length as
well as to achieve a security level equal to half the output length; (2) using quasi-cyclic codes instead
of purely random ones in order to get a short description for the hash function, allowing the underlying
matrix to be fit in the cache of a standard CPU, and thus considerably increasing the speed of FSB.
The FSB construction with these two modifications has been submitted to the SHA-3 competition, but
it did not pass the second round because of its performance. In what follows, we describe the SHA-3
FSB’s proposal [AFG+08].
The FSB hash function follows Merkle-Damga˚rd’s construction [Mer89, Dam89] based on a com-
pression function F from coding theory, as shown in Figure 4.1. This function (geen-framed) com-
presses s input bits to ` bits (s> `) and is defined by
F : Fs2→ F`2
x 7→ F (x) =M · (φ(x))>,
Where M is a quasi-cyclic matrix of size `×n, composed of ` block matrices Mi of size `× `, i.e.
M=M1 ‖M2 ‖ · · · ‖M`, and s = ω log2(n/ω). Furthermore, this compression is parameterized by a
number prime p such that 2 is a generator of Fp. This prime determines n` pre-defined vectors, each
having p bits. Each vector generates a block matrix Mˆi of size p× p, which should be truncated toMi.
The function x→ φ(x) is an encoding algorithm, which takes inputs of size s bits and returns regular
words of length n and weight ω according to Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 FSB’s regular encoder φ
Input : x a binary string of s bits with s = ω log2(n/ω)
Output : a regular word e = φ(x) of length n and weight ω.
e = (e1, · · · ,en)← 0n (initializing with n zeros)
j = ( j1, · · · , jω)
Write x = z ‖ t with |z|= `, |t|= s− `
Split z = (z1|| · · · ||zω) with |zi|= `ω (0≤ zi ≤ 2
`
ω −1)
Split t = (t1|| · · · ||t s−`
ω
) with |ti|= s−`ω (0≤ ti ≤ 2
s−`
ω −1)
for i = 0 to ω−1 do
j← i nω + zi+ ti2
`
ω
e j← 1
end for
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Figure 4.1.: Fast Syndrome-Based Hash function without a final transformation.
The FSB’s hashing process is shown in Figure 4.1. The message m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mk) (with
padding) to hash is first splitten into blocks mi, each of size s− ` bits. Then the intermediate hash
value hi, for i = 1, · · · ,k, is computed as
hi =F (mi ‖ hi−1),
where hi−1 = IV is an `-bit initial value. All IV ’s used in FSB are equal to 0`. This process will con-
tinue until the compression function finishes processing the entire message to produce the last result
hk, called pre-final hash. To obtain the hash value of the message by FSB hash function, hk is then
fed through a second compression function G to produce the desired hash length. The main reason
for using such function is that the FSB’s compression F cannot achieve a `2 -bit (resp. `-bit security)
against collision attack (resp. inversion attack).
For all versions of FSB, the Whirpool hashing algorithm [BR00] is used as a final compression func-
tion because of its nice properties. It possesses a high degree of non-linearity and behaves well even
its output is shortened to achieve a smaller size.
4.2.2. Theoretical security of FSB
As the FSB hash function follows the MD-design, its security is directly related to the security of
the underlying compression function F . More precisely, Merkle and Damga˚rd showed that if the
compression function is collision resistant, then the iterated hash function is collision resistant as
well. As demonstrated in [AFG+08] that the FSB compression function F has the following security
reduction:
• Collision resistance. Finding a collision for F is at least as hard as finding a codeword of length
n and weight≤ 2ω, which means solving an instance of the 2-regular Null-Syndrome Decoding
problem.
• Preimage resistance. Inverting F is at least as hard as finding a codeword of length n and
weight ω, which means solving an instance of the the Regular Syndrome Decoding problem.
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• Second preimage resistance. Finding a second preimage for F is at least as hard as finding a
codeword of length n and weight ω in a code, having a parity check matrix of size (`−ω)×
(n−ω).
4.2.3. Practical security of FSB
In practice, the FSB’s compression function F has to resist the following attacks: Information Set
Decoding algorithm [AFS05] (ISD), Generalized Birthday Attack (GBA) [Wag02, CJ04], and some
other cryptanalytic techniques [Saa07, FL08, KK06]. All parameter sets proposed for FSB were
selected so as to withstand all these attacks. As reported in [AFG+08], the security level provided by
a FSB version with output size k bits (denoted FSBk) against collision, inversion and second perimage
are respectively k2 , k, and k− l, where l is the logarithm to the base 2 of the message length. Note that
in [AFS05], a detailed analysis of the complexities of a ISD and GBA algorithm is given.
4.2.4. Efficiency of FSB
Theoretically the speed of FSB hash function depends mainly on the speed of the compression func-
tion F , which can be estimated as the number of bitwise XOR-operations required in each iteration
to process one bit of the input. As shown in [AFS05], this number, we denote here N f sb, is a function
in (n, `,ω), which is defined by
NFSB(n, `,ω) =
`ω
ω log2( nω)− `
Using differential calculus shows that the minimum of NFSB is always attained for ω0 = 2ln(`),
independently of n . Its minimum is equal to ωln( nω )−1 . So, for fixed ω, large values of n will further
improve the performance of FSB, however this will augment the size of the matrix to be used, and
hence increase the number of cache misses, which immediately affects the speed of the FSB.
4.2.5. Parameters choice for FSB.
Parameters for FSB are selected according the following rules:
• Choose ` in order to get the desired hash length and the security level required.
• `must be a multiple of 32 or 64 depending on the CPU architecture, in order to use the word-size
XORs.
• Choose n and ω such that
– nω a power of 2 (by construction) for reading an integer number of input bits at a time.
– the size `×n is smaller for avoiding the cache misses.
– ω is close to ω0
Five FSB’s instances [AFG+08] have been proposed, namely FSBk where output size
k ∈ {160,224,256,384,512}. Their parameter sets are shown in Table 4.1 below.
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Instance n ` ω p s
FSB160 5 ·218 640 80 653 1120
FSB224 7 ·218 896 112 907 1568
FSB256 221 1024 128 1061 1792
FSB384 23 ·216 1472 184 1483 2392
FSB512 31 ·216 1984 248 1987 3224
Table 4.1.: Parameters for the five instances of FSB hash function, where s = ω log2( nω) and p is the
smallest prime number such that p≥ ` and 2 is a generator of Fp.
4.3. The S-FSB Hash function
In this section we present our construction, which is an improved variant of FSB family in terms of
performance. We call it S-FSB hash family, which stands for Sponge Fast Syndrome Based hash
family. To do so, we will use the same notations as in the previous section and define four positive
integers n,`, r and c such that the ratio nω is a power of 2, and `= r+ c = ω log2(
n
ω).
4.3.1. Description of S-FSB
The main idea behind S-FSB is to use the sponge design principle [BDPA07] based on a one-to-one
transformation T rather than a compression functionF (Figure ) according to the MD-paradigm [Mer89,
Dam89] used in FSB. This transformation is similar to that of the SYND stream cipher, which we have
presented in Chapter 3. It is defined by
T : F`2→ F`2 (4.1)
x 7→M · (φ(x))>. (4.2)
Where M is a random binary matrix of size `×n and the mapping x→ φ(x) is a regular encoding
algorithm as in FSB. For plugging this transformation into the sponge construction, we take ` width,
r the rate, and c the capacity such that `= r+ c.
As explained in 2.4.3 the message m to be hashed must be padded according to a sponge-compliant
padding rule such that the last block be non-zero and broken into blocks mi of r bits. That is, m =
(m1, · · · ,mk). Then the ` bits of the state are all zeros, i.e. IV = 0` and the the sponge construction
proceeds in two steps:
• Absorbing step: this step is illustrated in Figure 4.2. Each message block mi is proceeded as
follows: Let si−1 be the `-bit input of round i such that si−1 = s
(1)
i−1 ‖ s(2)i−1 with |s(1)i−1| = r and
|s(2)i−1|= c. The output si of round i is then computed as
si = T (s
(1)
i−1⊕mi,s(2)i−1) with s0 = IV = 0`
When all input blocks are processed, the S-FSB construction switches to the squeezing step.
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• Squeezing step: in this step the internal state (si)i≥k should be first updated by
si+1 = T (si) with i≥ k
and then truncated to b (b≤ r) bits to produce the pre-final hash values hi. The final l-bit hash
value h of the message m is obtained as the concatenation of those hash values, i.e. h = h1 ‖
h2 ‖ · · · ‖ hd , where d is the number of output blocks, which is chosen at will by the user such
that l = db. In S-FSB, we take d = 2, and b = r = l.
Figure 4.3 explains how the squeezing step works.
Figure 4.2.: Absorbing step of S-FSB hash function.
As in FSB hash function, the performance of S-FSB depends directly on the number of the bitwise
XOR operations computed at each round to treat the r bits of one message block. That is, one needs
first r XORs for the bitwise addition and then ` XORs of ω columns of the matrix M. This result to
r+ `ω binary XOR-operations. Since the number of bits of each message block is r, the number of
expected binary XORs (denoted by Nsfsb) in average for each message input bit is:
NS-FSB(ω,r,c) =
r+ `ω
r
=
r+(r+ c)ω
r
= 1+ω(1+
c
r
), (4.3)
where `= r+ c = ω log2( nω).
This results to
NS-FSB(n,ω,r,c) = 1+
ω2 log2( nω)
r
= 1+
ω2 log2( nω)
r
(4.4)
This function depends on three main parameters ω, r, and c and is the main measure to estimate the
theoretical performance of S-FSB.
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Figure 4.3.: Squeezing step of S-FSB hash function.
4.3.2. Security Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the security of the S-FSB hash function. We first show how the secu-
rity of S-FSB is reducible to the two variants of the syndrome decoding problems as in FSB. More
precisely, finding pre-images (resp. collisions) for S-FSB is related to the hardness of the regular
syndrome decoding pro (resp. 2-null-regular syndrome decoding) problem. Then we identify all best-
known attacks against the S-FSB hash function and estimate their minimal complexities.
Theoretical Security
For analyzing the theoretical security of S-FSB, we need to introduce the following definitions to
understand how generic attacks work against sponge-based hash functions. With generic attacks, we
mean attacks that do not exploit special properties of the underlying transformation.
In our analysis we will denote by [e]c and [e]r the inner and the outer state of an `-bit state e, respec-
tively. That is, e = [e]r ‖ [e]c with `= r+ c.
Definition 4.3.1 (Absorbing function). The absorbing function abs(·) of a sponge construction S ,
takes as input a padded message x of length multiple of r and returns the value of the state e obtained
after absorbing x, i.e. abs(x) = e.
Definition 4.3.2 (Path). Let abs(·) be the absorbing function. An input x is called path to the state e
if abs(x) = e.
Definition 4.3.3 (Squeezing function). The squeezing function sqz(·) of a sponge construction S ,
takes as input an `-bit state e given at the beginning of the squeezing step and returns an l-bit string
the output truncated to l bits of S .
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In general, it is difficult to find an `-bit state e that satisfies sqz(e) = z, when the length of z is large
enough.
Definition 4.3.4 (Output binding problem). Given a random string z. Output binding problem is to
find a state e such that sqz(e) = z.
In output binding the string z is not mandatory equal to the result of the squeezing of a state e
and hence the equation sqz(e) = z may admit no solution. The expected number of solutions of this
problem is 2`−|z|. If ` < |z|, the probability to find a solution is roughly 2`−|z|. On the other hand, if
the string z has been actually obtained by squeezing an state e, then we talk about the state recovery
problem, which reads as follows.
Definition 4.3.5 (State recovery problem). State recovery problem consists in finding a state e, given
a string z verifying sqz(e) = z.
Definition 4.3.6 (State collision). A state collision is a pair of two distinct paths x, x′ such that
abs(x) = abs(x′).
Definition 4.3.7 (Inner collision). Let x, x′ be to distinct paths with abs(x) = e, and abs(x′) = e′.
The pair (x,x′) is said to be an inner collision if ec = e′c.
Definition 4.3.8 (Output collision). Let S be a sponge construction. An output collision (or just
collision) for S is a pair of distinct paths x, x′ that have the same hash value under S , i.e. S(x) = S(x′).
The following proposition shows the relation between inner collision and state collisions.
Proposition 4.3.1. Let S be a sponge construction with absorbing function abs(·). The problem of
finding state collisions for S is equivalent to the problem of finding inner collisions for S .
Proof. First we show that a state collision implies an inner collision. Let x, x′ be a state collision.
Then, by definition we have abs(x) = abs(x′), which implies that [abs(x)]c = [abs(x′)]c, and hence
x, x′ is also an inner collision.
Conversely, assume the existence of inner collisions. That means, there exist two distinct paths z and
z′ with [abs(z)]c = [abs(z′)]c. In order to construct a state collision, we perform the following steps:
• Compute the r-bit parts of z and z′, i.e. [abs(z)]r and [abs(z′)]r,
• Find two r-bit strings y and y′ such that [abs(z)]r⊕ y = [abs(z′)]r⊕ y′.
• Set t = z ‖ y and t ′ = z′ ‖ y′.
By doing so, t and t ′ are distinct and form a state collision for S . Indeed, the states ([abs(z)]r⊕y) ‖
[abs(z)]c and ([abs(z′)]r⊕ y′) ‖ [abs(z′)]c are equal and hence lead to the same value under abs(·).
Furthermore, any pair of the form t ‖ t∗ and t ′ ‖ t∗, where t∗ is an arbitrary input block leads to an
output collision, independent of the hash length.
In order to analyze the security of S-FSB hash function, we first explain how the sponge con-
struction based on a random transformation can be generically cryptanalyzed. We then apply these
cryptanalysis techniques when replacing the random transformation by the code-based one, which is
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defined by equation 4.1. The most techniques described here are given in [BDPA11a].
Let S be a sponge construction with absorbing function abs(·), and squeezing function sqz(·). Let
F denote a random transformation and T be the function defined in S-FSB. For attacking the sponge
construction in general, the following strategies can be used to find (output) collisions, preimages, and
second preimages.
Output collisions. As proven in Proposition 4.3.1, the existence of inner collisions plays an impor-
tant role to build collisions in the hash value. Therefore, in order to end up with collision resistance in
the hash values, it is sufficient to prevent inner collisions. As shown in [BDPA11a], an inner collision
is clearly producible with workload min(2
c+3
2 ,2
l+3
2 ), when a random transformation f is used, where
l is the hash length. However, when looking for inner collisions in S-FSB based on T , the security is
equivalent to the security of an FSB variant mapping to c bits. More precisely, let Let (n,ω,r,c) be
the parameter sets for an S-FSB hash function scheme. Moreover, let n = nr +nc and ω= ωr +ωc be
the corresponding columns of H and weights of the input regular word belonging to the first r bits and
the last c bits, respectively, i.e. nr = (n · r)/s and ωr = (ω · r)/s. Thus, the workload to produce an
inner collision for S-FSB is exactly as an FSB with parameters (nr,c,ωr). In [AFG+08], it is shown
that finding a collision for the function T applied on FSB is at least as difficult as finding a word of
weight ≤ 2ω and vice versa. That meas, finding inner (and also output) collisions in S-FSB requires
solving an instance of the 2-Null Regular Syndrome Decoding problem with parameters (nr,c,ωr).
Moreover, we need to consider the entire mapping T : F`2 → F`2 according to state collisions. Here,
we need to ensure that the instantiation of an 2-NRSD with parameters (n, `,ω) is hard. To sum up,
S-FSB comes up with the following bound on the workload to produce a collision.
Proposition 4.3.2 (collision resistance). Let h be an S-FSB(n,w,r,c) hash function scheme instanti-
ated with parameters (n,ω,r,c) where n = nr +nc and ω = ωr +ωc. For any adversary A the lower
bound of the workload to output two distinct input messages x,x′ mapping to the same hash value is
min(RSD(nr,c,2ωr),RSD(n, `,2ω)).
Proof. Let A be an adversary successfully returning two preimages x,x′ mapping to the same hash
value y of an S-FSB instance with parameter sets (n,ω,r,c). We show that given A we build an
adversary B either providing a collision in FSB with parameter sets (nr,c,ωr) or solving efficiently a
syndrome decoding problem SD(n,s,w). Due to the sponge construction, an inner collision suffices
to produce (multi) collisions. An inner collision implies solving a FSB instance with parameter sets
(nr,c,ωr). If A outputs efficiently a (outer) collision which consequently means an inner collision
as well, B simply returns both preimages as a collision for the FSB instance. The workload solving
FSB(nr,c,ωr) equals RSD(nr,c,2ωr), proven in [AFG+08].
If A strategy neglects inner collisions and approaches directly to find two distinct preimages to the
mapping T of S-FSB, similar to FSB, finding a collision in T for random binary matrix H equals the
2-RNSD problem, i.e. B returns x¯ = x+ x′ given by A as the solution of the 2-RNSD with parameter
(n,s,ω).
(Second) Preimages. Let l be the hash length. To find a preimage for S based on F , an attacker
A has the following two approaches to succeed. Firstly, A could bind the output h ∈ {0,1}l to a
state s ∈ {0,1}`. Then, A inverts T (if possible) to reach a state t = F −1(s) = tr||tc. At that point,
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a possible path tpre = tpre,r||tpre,c ∈ {0,1}` is required, which leads to the same capacity as t, i.e.
tpre,c = tc. Hence, A takes the path to tpre and let tpre,r⊕ tr) be absorbed by T . This results to a desired
preimage of output h. The overall workload amounts to the cost of inverting T plus 2c/2 + 2l−r. If
inverting T is impossible, the output is bound directly to state t. We require that the first r bits of T (t)
matches to the l bits of h. The workload of finding such a state U is of order 2l +2c−1.
Now, we analyze the security against preimage attacks when we replace the random function F by
T as this is the case in S-FSB. Since T is invertible (even if it is hard) both approaches described
above are realizable.
The first method needs to invert T or equivalently, solving an instance of the regular syndrome
decoding. Thus, the cost to find a preimage to mapping H costs RSD(n, `,ω). Finding a path to
state tpre costs exactly as an inner collision. A more efficient way to produce a preimage is given by
the second approach. First, we find a state t ∈ {0,1}` such that T (t) matches the l bits of output h.
Therefore, we require to solve an RSD instance with parameters (n, `,ω) and end up with an expected
workload of the order RSD(n, `,ω)+RSD(nr,c,ωr) whereas the latter term corresponds the workload
for finding a path to the desired state.
A second preimage x′ ∈ {0,1}` to a given image y= T (x) is obtained either by pursuing the strategy
of finding a preimage as described above or by finding a second path to one of the inner states of
message x. In [BDPA07], it is shown that for a random function S the workload to output a second
preimage is of order 2c/|P| if |P|< 2c/2 where |P| denotes the bit length of a given preimage P. Note
that the expected workload is at least as large as outputting an inner collision since a second preimage
implies an inner collision.
When replacing the random function F by transformation T , finding a second path to one of the
inner states results in an expected workload of inverting an syndrome decoding instance with inputs
(nr,c,ωr) divided by the the path length |P|. To summarize, we obtain the following proposition
concerning the (second) preimage resistance of S-FSB.
Proposition 4.3.3 (Preimage Resistance). Let S-FSB(n,ω,r,c) be an S-FSB hash function scheme in-
stantiated with parameters (n,ω,r,c) with n = nr + nc and ω = ωr +ωc. For any adversary A the
expected workload to find a message x such that h = S-FSB(n,ω,r,c)(x) to a given h ∈ {0,1}l is of order
min(RSD(n, `,ω)+RSD(nr,c,ωr),2l +2c−1),
Proposition 4.3.4 (Second Preimage Resistance). Let S-FSB(n,ω,r,c) be a hash function scheme instan-
tiated with parameters (n,ω,r,c) with n= nr+nc and ω=ωr+ωc. For any adversary A the expected
workload find a message x′ with x 6= x′ to a given message x ∈ {0,1}m such that S-FSB(n,ω,r,c)(x) =
S-FSB(n,ω,r,c)(x′) is of order min(RSD(nr,c,ωr),2c/2)/|P|, where |P| denotes the bit length of a given
preimage P.
Practical Security
As shown previously, the security of S-FSB is related to the hardness of solving instances of two
problems: RSD and 2-NRSD problem. In practice, to assess this security regarding the collision and
(second) preimage resistance, we have to identify all known applicable attacks and to estimate the
minimal complexities required to execute these attacks. As far as we know, there exist two kind of
attacks: Information Set Decoding (ISD), Generalized Birthday Attack (GBA). The essential idea be-
hind these algorithms is explained in the previous Chapter.
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Information Set Decoding (ISD). Let Pr(n, `,ω) be the probability that a given information set is
valid for one given solution of RSD. Let denote by Nr(n, `,ω) the expected number of solution of
RSD. As stated in [AFS05], the probability P(n, `,ω) can approximated by P(n, `,ω) = Pr(n, `,ω)×
Nr(n, `,ω). Since there exist
( n
ω
)ω regular words, then the average number of solutions of RSD is
Nr(n, `,ω) =
( n
ω
)ω
2`
.
In our setting, we have ` = ω log2(n/ω). This results in Nr(n, `,ω) =
( nω)
ω
( nω)
ω = 1. That means, we
have only one solution to RSD, on average. Furthermore, as shown in [AFS05], the Pr(n, `,ω) is given
by
Pr(n, `,ω) =
( s
n
)ω
=
(
log2(n/ω)
n/ω
)ω
If we set log2(n/ω) = β, for some integers β, then the final probability of selecting a valid set to invert
RSD equals to:
P(n, `,ω) = Pr(n, `,ω)×Nr(n, `,ω) =
(
β
2β
)ω
with β= log2(n/ω). (4.5)
To estimate the cost of finding collisions, we have to evaluate the complexity of solving the 2-RNSD
problem stated above. This can be done in the same way as in [AFS05]. We compute the number of
two-regulars words, then we multiply it by the probability of the validity, to get the total probability
of choosing a valid set. This probability, denoted by PI , is given by:
PI(n, `,ω) =
(ω
n
)ω[(log2(n/ω)
2
)
+1
]ω
For simplicity, we can assume that β ≥ 2. So, we get an upper bound for this probability, denoted
by PC, which is equal to:
PC(n, `,ω) =
(
β2
2β+1
)ω
with β= log2(n/ω). (4.6)
From the equation (4.6), we conclude that the probability for a random information set to be valid
in case of collisions search is larger by a factor (β2 )
ω compared to the probability for a random infor-
mation set to be valid in case of finding preimages, where β= log2(n/ω).
In practice, there exists a lower bound for information set decoding attacks, presented in [BTP11].
Moreover, a new variant of ISD algorithm [BLPS11a] was developed for estimating the hardness of
solving the 2-Regular Null Syndrome Decoding problem (2-RNSD). These algorithms run faster than
the lower bounds given in [FS09]. The parameters we propose in the next section are chosen to resist
all these attacks.
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Generalized Birthday Attack (GBA). As in Chapter 3, we use the the attack from Matthieu and
Sendrier [FS09], which relies on the Generalized Birthday Problem introduced by Wagner [Wag02],
whose idea is as follows.
For a given integer α, to find a set of indexes I = {1,2, · · · ,2α} verifying
⊕
i∈I
Hi = 0.
To find this set I , one has to compile 2α lists of 2
`
α+1 elements containing distinct columns of the
matrix H of size `×n. These lists are then pairwise combined to get 2α−1 lists of XORs of 2 columns
of H. In the resulting lists, only 2 columns starting with `α+1 zeros are kept, instead of all the possible
columns. Then, the new lists are pairwise merged to obtain 2α−2 lists of XORs of 4 columns of H.
Only 4 columns of H starting with 2 `α+1 zeros, are kept. This process will be continued, until only two
lists are left. These two lists will contain 2
`
α+1 XORs of 2α−1 columns of H having (α−1) `α+1 zeros
at the beginning. After that, the standard birthday algorithm can be applied to get one solution. Since
all lists treated above, have the same size `α+1 , the complexity of GBA is at least in O
(
`
α+1 2
`
α+1 )
)
.
As we can see in this algorithm, the number of XORed columns was a power of 2. However, this
does not hold in general because the weight w can be any number. So if w is not a power of 2, one
can modify the above algorithm such that one can back in the general case of GBA by imposing
the following condition on α: 12α
( n
2ω
2α
) ≥ 2 `−αα (see [FS09] for more details). This condition can be
rewritten as:
(
2βω
2(1−α)ω
)
≥ 2βω+α(α−1) (4.7)
where log2(n/ω) = β. In this case, one gets a lower bound of the cost of solving an instance SD
problem with parameters (n, `,ω) as follows:
(
ωβ
α
−1
)
2
ωβ
α −1. (4.8)
As we can see, for fixed weight ω, this complexity is an increasing function in n. So, to avoid the
GBA attack, we have to choose large n.
In [BLN+09] an implementation of GBA is presented against the compression function of FSB.
This implementation includes two techniques introduced in [Ber07] in order to mount GBA on com-
puters, which do not have enough storage capacity to hold all list entries. However, the complexity of
this attack is still exponential. Since our scheme is based on the FSB compression function, we claim
that our proposal is secure against this implementation.
Other possible attacks. In addition to the previous attacks, it was shown in [GLP08] that the
sponge-based hash functions can be attacked by slide attacks. This kind of attacks was introduced
in [BW99] by Biryukov et.al for cryptanalyzing iterative block ciphers. For attacking a sponge-like
construction, the self-similarity issue can be exploited, meaning that all the blank rounds behave
identically. As noted in [GLP08], a simple defense against slide attacks consists in adding nonzero
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constant just before running the blank rounds. This can be achieved by a convenient padding such
that the last block of the message is different from null vector. That is exactly, what we are used in
our construction. Therefore, our proposal is secure against slide attacks. In [Saa07], the so-called
linearization attack (LA) was proposed against FSB to find collisions. The key idea is to reduce the
problem of finding collisions to a linear algebra problem that can be solved in polynomial time, when
the ratio `/ω is up to 2. Furthermore, as shown in [Saa07], this attack can still be applied if ` > ω. It
can be extended even to ` > 2ω with complexity O(`3
(3
4
)`−2ω
). So, to avoid the LA attack, we have
to choose ` > 2ω.
4.3.3. Parameters Choice
When selecting parameters for S-FSB, we have to look for parameters providing the desired security
with least processing cost required to hash one bit of the message. As mentioned in Section 4.3, this
cost can be theoretically measured using the function Ns f sb defined by the following equation
NS−FSB(n,ω,r,c) = 1+
ω2 log2(n/ω)
r
= 1+
ω`
r
= 1+
ω(r+ c)
r
= 1+ω
(
1+
c
r
)
(4.9)
We observe that for increasing values of c, this function is an implicitly increasing quantity in ω
and n. So, if we want to have a good performance, then we have to choose small values of c (as
small as possible) and select w and n such that the value of r are large. But from security point of
view, we should choose ` greater than 2ω+1 to withstand the linearization attack mentioned earlier.
Furthermore, to avoid inner and outer collisions, the running time of solving instances of RSD and
2-RNSD with parameters (n, `,ω) and (nr,c,ωr) according the best known collision attack, must be
larger than the desired security.
Starting from those conditions, we propose three parameter sets (n, `,ω,c) that provide different
security levels. Those sets of parameters are presented in Table 4.2 together with the corresponding
numbers of XORs and the complexities of the ISD and GBA attacks.
Preimage Collision
Hash size l n ` ω c NS−FSB GBA ISD GBA ISD
160 3 ·219 384 24 240 64.0 2130 299 286 291
224 17 ·217 544 34 336 88.9 2150 2144 2114 2122
256 39 ·217 624 39 296 90.5 2246 2172 2129 2148
Table 4.2.: Proposed parameters for S-FSB
4.3.4. Performance and Comparison
S-FSB has been implemented on a 2.53 GHz Pentium Core2 Duo, running Linux (Ubuntu 10.04) 32
Bit with 6MB of cache and 4GB of RAM. The C compiler is GCC, version 4.4.3 with -O3 optimiza-
tion. The performance of the three versions of S-FSB is reported in Table 4.3. This performance was
measured on a message of size 1 GB. The file hash time in the third row was measured by repeated
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calls to the clock() function to get the current millisecond clock value and subtracted the stop time
from the start time. The number of samples we performed is about one million. To get the speed ex-
pressed in cycles per bytes, we multiplied the measured hash time by the CPU frequency and divided
the result by the file size in bytes. The C-code of S-FSB can be found in [Cay11].
In order to compare our results with those of FSB SHA-3 proposal [INR07], we ran the C-code
of FSB on the same desktop and we obtained the results presented in Table 4.5. As we can see, the
S-FSB is more efficient than FSB by a factor of 1.44 (30%). Furthermore, we have small storage
capacity comparable to FSB. We leverage quasi-cyclic codes in our implementation. Despite these
improvements, the S-FSB hash family remains slower than the existing hash functions like the SHA-2
family.
Hash size (bits) File size (MB) File hash time (s) Speed (cpb)
160 1000 66.90 160
224 1000 84.48 201
256 1000 75.63 183
Table 4.3.: Performance of S-FSB in [Cay11] .
Hash size (bits) File size (MB) File hash time (s) Speed (cpb)
160 1000 87.76 212
224 1000 102.99 248
256 1000 109.38 264
Table 4.4.: Performance of FSB SHA-3 proposal in [INR07].
It is worth mentioning that in [CSM] optimized implementations of FSB and S-FSB are proposed
and available on [San12]. Using the same parameters and for the same hash size as above, their
implementation results are listed below.
Hash size (bits) Speed of FSB (cpb) Speed of S-FSB(cpb)
160 110 79
224 131 99
256 204 172
Table 4.5.: Performance of FSB and S-FSB in [CSM].
62
4.4. The RFSB Hash Function
4.4. The RFSB Hash Function
In this section, we describe the RFSB hash function [BLPS11b] (Really Fast Syndrome Based hash
function), which is a further enhanced variant of FSB in terms of efficiency.
4.4.1. Description of the RFSB hash function
RFSB [BLPS11b] was also proposed in 2011 and slightly changes the way the quasi-cyclic matrices
are handled. The shift is made during the sum up, depending only on the rank in this sum. It also takes
advantage of hardware considerations to improve the efficiency a lot. RFSB selects the xored columns
in a simpler way, which alleviate the matrix a lot. Theses columns are then shifted and properly xored.
This approach was chosen to simplify the implementations as mush as possible. Like FSB, the RFSB
follows also the MD-design and its compression function G takes s-bit inputs and returns ` bit strings,
where s=ωb> ` for some positive integer b verifying n=ω2b. Formally, the function G is described
as follows. Let x = (x1,x2, · · · ,xω) be an s-bit input of G, where each xi of length b bits, which is
represented by an integer yi between 0 and 2b− 1. Let H be a matrix of size `× n. As n = ω2b, H
contains ω block matrices, each of size `× 2b. That is, H = H1 ‖ H2 ‖ · · · ‖ Hω. According to the
MD-construction, x is composed of a (s− `)-bit message block and the current state of size `. The
next state G(x) is computed by:
G(x) = h(y1)1 ⊕h(y2)2 ⊕·· ·⊕h(yω)ω .
Where h(y j)j is a certain column of H j, for j = 1, · · · ,ω. Figure 4.4 shows how G(x) is calculated.
A detailed RFSB hash algorithm can be found in [MAC11, Algorithm 5].
Figure 4.4.: Compression function of RFSB hash function.
The specifications of RFSB in [BLPS11b] only take into account one set of parameters, which is
intended to use the hardware registers at their best. This set is (n, `,ω) = (28672,509,112).
4.4.2. Security of RFSB
In [BLPS11b], a detailed security analysis of RFSB is done showing that it is secure against all the
best attacks like ISD and GBA algorithms. RFSB is designed to provide 128-bit security. From a
theoretical point of view, it is straightforward to prove that the security of RFSB is related to the
hardness of solving instances of RSD and 2-NRSD problems.
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4.4.3. Performance of RFSB
In [BLPS11b] the authors report an implementation of RFSB with `= 509 (noted by RFSB-509) that
outperforms SHA-256 on Intel Core 2 Quad Q9550 CPUs at 13.62 versus 15.26 cycles/byte. The
latest measurements available on eBASH project∗ show that RFSB-509 runs even at 10.64 cycles/byte
while SHA-256 remains at 15.31 cycles/byte on the same platform. Furthermore, [RWMC11] presents
a software implementation for RFSB with ` ∈ {227,379,509,1019} and provides performance mea-
surements for all four instances. However, the speeds in [RWMC11] are not close to the speeds
reported in the original RFSB paper (e.g., the speed of RFSB-509 is 120.5 cycles/byte on an Intel i7
CPU). In addition, the authors in [CSM] suggest a implementation for RFSB-509 and reports a speed
only of 17.26 cycles/byte. Table 4.6 gives speed information about RFSB variants according to the
available implementations.
Variant Speed (cycles/byte) Speed (cycles/byte) Speed (cycles/byte)
in [RWMC11] in [CSM] in [BLPS11b]
RFSB-227 42.4 - -
RFSB-379 62.8 - -
RFSB-509 120.5 17.26 13.62
RFSB-1019 152.8 - -
Table 4.6.: Performance of RFSB.
4.5. Conclusion and Open Problems
We have shown how to construct a provably secure variant of the FSB hash family following the
sponge construction. Although its speed is better than the original FSB hash function and its security
is reducible to the hardness of solving to NP-complete problems, it suffers from some drawbacks. It
remains far slower than SHA-1 family, because it possesses a long initialization step for generating the
underlying matrix. Furthermore, its description is large (this is also the case for FSB), since it require
big matrices generated from about two millions bits of the digits of pi. A simple way to reduce the
size of these matrices is to introduce a constant weight encoder, which requires only small parameters.
However, weight encoders run slower than regular ones. They will slow down the computation too
much, and hence worsen the performance as well as the security of the hash function. Hence, an
efficient construction of such a encoder would be an asset but remains an open problem. Another
useful trick to increase the speed of the hash function is to renounce the underlying encoder and
use another technique to perform the matrix-vector multiplication without any encoding algorithm as
introduced in RFSB.
∗http://bench.cr.yp.to/ebash.html
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Chapter 5
Parameters Selection for the McEliece-like
Cryptosystems
5.1. Motivation
Public key encryption plays a vital role in securing sensitive data in practical applications. When
public key cryptosystems are used in such applications appropriate key sizes must be selected. For
number-theory-based systems such as RSA, and EC-ElGamal, Lenstra and Verheul proposed a frame-
work on how to select appropriate keys that provide security until a given year. In code-based cryp-
tography, as far we know, this is still an open problem. In this chapter we address this issue and show
how to select optimal parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem that provide security until a given
year and give detailed recommendations. This is our main contribution, which has been appeared
in [NMBB12].
5.2. Our Security Model
In this section we introduce the security model we use. This model is obtained by adapting the
Lenstra-Verheul framework based on Moores Law and is essentially made up of three parts. First we
begin by analyzing the McEliece cryptosystem from security point of view. Then we explain how the
Lenstra-Verheul model works and finally we give a sensitive analysis, which quantifies the robustness
of our model, and it allows users to apply our results even if they have different assumptions about the
correct values.
Security of the McEliece cryptosystem
For attacking the McEliece cryptosystem, there exist to families of algorithms. The structural and
decoding attacks. The former aim at recovering the private key from the public key. [EOS06] gives a
detailed overview of these attacks. The latter attempts to derive the plainttext from a given cipertext,
and is based on Information Set Decoding (ISD) technique. It seems to outperform all other tech-
niques in terms of complexity. Therefore, our security analysis will based on the complexity of this
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kind of attack.
Many ISD algorithms have been developed and proposed in the literature. The most important of
these are presented in Table 5.2, together with their respective complexity to decode a (1024,524,50)
Goppa code (these are the original McEliece parameters).
Binary logarithm
Year Algorithm of complexity
1986 Adams-Mejier [AM89] 80.7
1988 Lee-Brickell [LB88] 70.89
1989 Stern [Ste89] 66.21
1994 Canteaut-Chabanne [CC94] 65.5
1998 Canteaut-Chabaud [CC98] 64.1
2008 Bernstein-Lange-Peters [BTP08] 60.4
2009 Finiasz-Sendrier [FS09] 59.9
Table 5.1.: Complexity of ISD algorithms against (1024,524,50) McEliece cryptosystem
For estimating the security level, denoted by S(n,k, t), against a given (n,k, t) Goppa code, we use
the lower bounds of ISD algorithms proposed in the paper [NCBBb] (extended version of [NCBBa]),
which is based on the lower bounds in [FS09] and the idea of [BLP11].
Remark 5.2.1. In [FGO+10] a distinguisher against binary Goppa codes of high rate has been
proposed. This distinguisher uses the algebraic techniques introduced in [FOPT10] and works only
under certain requirements on the parameters. The parameters we propose, however, do not satisfy
these constraints, and are therefore secure against the techniques in [FGO+10].
Remark 5.2.2. In [JJ02] a further ISD algorithm has been published, which attempts to solve only
one SD instance out of many. However no asymptotic analysis of the advantage of this algorithm is
provided when attacking multiple targets instead of 1. Against the (1024,524,50) McEliece cryptosys-
tem with a single ciphertext, this algorithm requires at least 268.1 binary operations.
Lenstra-Verheul model
In [LV01] Lenstra and Verheul (LV) proposed a mathematical model providing key length recom-
mendations for public-key cryptosystems based on integer factorization (IF), discrete logarithm (DL),
and elliptic curve DL. This is the first important work that uses a mathematical approach for the de-
termination of secure key sizes based on concrete parameters. After the introduction of this model,
several papers made use of it to find appropriate key lengths for cryptographic primitives (see, for
example, [MQSW01], and [Sze08]). Furthermore, many companies have used this model to esti-
mate the accepted key length for their cryptographic applications. For instance, in 2004, McAfee,
the computer security company applied the LV-model to find the minimal key size for SSL connec-
tions [Ara04]. Another interesting organization is the BlueKrypt company which hosts the website
www.keylength.com. This site has an implementation of the LV-model and summarizes reports from
well-known organizations allowing the evaluation of the minimum security requirements for some
symmetric and asymmetric systems in the future. The LV-model is explained in more detail below.
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The LV-model is based on a number of assumptions that combine the impact of cryptanalytic
progress and the effect of changes in computing environment. The key points of this model on which
the choice of parameters depends are the following:
1. Security margin: It is the year s which is used to “anchor” the extrapolation. In [LV01]
the default value of s is 1982 which represents the last year for which it is assumed that a 56-bit
key DES cryptosystem provides adequate security for commercial use. The computational ef-
fort for breaking the 56-bit DES system was estimated to be 5 ·105 MIPS-years.
In order to estimate the security level provided at a given year, Lenstra and Verheul define a
function IMY(y). This abbreviation stands for “Infeasible number of MIPS-years∗ for year y”,
and it refers to the minimum computational effort that is expected to be infeasible to do in
year y.
In general, we define IMY(y) in such a way that a successful attack using tens of thousands of
year-y CPUs requires more than 100 years to finish. The number of CPUs is a rough estimate
for the effort a security agency might put into an attack. The number of years is derived from
the fact that US law used to require some national secrets to be protected for 75 years†.
2. Computing environment: This estimates the changes in computational power available
to attackers. This estimation is based on a slight variation of Moore’s law by introducing three
variables a, b, and c that specify the changes in hardware speed, IT budget, and price over time.
The definitions of these variables and their default values are as follows:
• a is the expected average number of months in which processor speed and memory size
increase by a factor of two. The default value is a = 18, which is the value specified by
Moore’s law and is so far in line with current hardware developments. In this paper we are
going to use the same value due to the fact that over the last years, hardware development
has resulted in a doubling of transistors (for a fixed price) every 12–24 months‡. Thus,
a default of 18 is a compromise of this historic data. Also, opinions differ in whether
hardware development will slow down or new technologies will further accelerate it;
• c ∈ {0,1} indicates how to interpret the variable a. For c = 0, the amount of computing
power and memory which is available to an attacker doubles every a months, while for
c = 1, the computing power and RAM for a given price double every a months. We will
use c = 1 since the historic trend mentioned above refers to a fixed price.
• b is defined as the average number of months it takes for IT budgets to double. According
to historic data§, the US Gross National Product has doubled approx. every 10.5 years
over the last 30 years. Since the exact growth varies every year, we will use an average
value to extrapolate over a larger period of time. Our default setting for b is 120.
3. Cryptanalysis: This refers to the expected cryptanalytic progress. It is measured by the
number of months r it is expected for cryptanalytic attacks to become twice as effective. We
estimate this number by attacks against code-based cryptosystems only, since the cryptanalytic
∗MIPS = million instructions per second
†For example, the report on the Kennedy assassination; see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_F._Kennedy_
assassination
‡See http://wi-fizzle.com/compsci/
§See http://www.bea.gov
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development can be very different for other cryptosystems. Lenstra and Verheul’s default value
is r = 18. In code-based cryptography, we find it reasonable to assume that the pace of future
cryptanalytic developments and their impact will be relatively close to what we have seen from
1988 until 2009. By applying a linear regression on data points listed in Table 5.2, we get a line
whose slope roughly equals −0.41 meaning that a twofold attack efficiency improvement will
happen in each 1/0.41≈ 2.44 years. Also the value of r is r = 2.44 ·12≈ 29.27. In this paper,
we take r = 30, which corresponds to 2.5 years.
Based on these points, Lenstra and Verheul give a formula allowing to determine lower bounds
for the algorithmic complexity that offer a specified security margin at least until year y in the future
(independent of the concrete asymmetric cryptosystem). To do this, they show how IMY(y) is esti-
mated from the points above. Given that breaking the DES system takes 5 · 105 MIPS-years, which
was infeasible in the year s = 1982, the function IMY(y) is defined by:
IMY(y) = 5 ·105 ·212(y−s)/a ·212c(y−s)/b MIPS-years. (5.1)
With our default settings, it follows that in year y a computational complexity of
IMY(y) = 5 ·105 ·2 2330 (y−1982) MIPS-years (5.2)
provides an acceptable level of security. The next step is to convert this lower bound expressed in
MIPS-years to a lower bound for the number of binary operations. In order to do that, we use as
a data point the result [BTP08] that approximately 260.4 binary operations are needed to break the
original McEliece with parameters (1024,524,50); expecting cryptanalytic developments by a factor
212(y−2008)/r (with r = 30), we claim that a sufficient condition for security level, denoted by S(n,k, t),
of a McEliece instance with parameter set (n,k, t) providing an adequate security until a given year y
is the following:
S(n,k, t)≥ IMY(y) ·2
12(y−2008)/30 ·260.4
1.7 ·105 . (5.3)
As in [LV01, Page 9], S(n,k, t) is defined as the expected runtime of the fastest algorithm pub-
lished today for attacking the McEliece cryptosystem with the parameter set (n,k, t). In our case, this
corresponds to the lower bounds presented in [NCBBa, NCBBb]. The value 1.7 · 105 is expressed
in MIPS-years and obtained from the fact that the attack by Bernstein et al. [BTP08] required 1400
CPU days on Q6600 quad processors. Assuming that a Q6600 processor [BTP08] does approximately
44,000 MIPS (SiSoft Sandra benchmark and [AJ07]), this corresponds to 1.7 ·105 MIPS-years.
Therefore, the inequality (5.3) becomes:
S(n,k, t)≥ 2.9412 ·2 2330 (y−1982)+ 1230 (y−2008)+60.4 (5.4)
Analysis and discussion
In this subsection, we provide a sensitivity analysis for the values we explained in the previous sub-
section. More specifically, we estimate and discuss the impact that a different value of each variable
has on the resulting security level.
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Security margin 1982 and DES-56 bit
The function IMY(y) was “anchored” by defining 1982 as the last year in which breaking the DES
scheme with 56-bit key was considered infeasible. The choice to use DES with 56-bit for this defini-
tion is arbitrary; the function, therefore, is defined using the number of operations required to break
the DES scheme, and it is thus independent of which cryptosystem was used for the definition.
Any other year and/or cryptosystem can be used for the definition, e.g. AES or RSA. Using the
data from the 2008 attack by Bernstein et al. [BTP08] that a 44,000 MIPS CPU breaks the origi-
nal McEliece parameters in 1400 CPU-days, the attack complexity estimated as 260 operations cor-
responds to 217.3 MIPS years. An attack complexity of 280 operations, which was considered the
“smallest general-purpose level” of security¶ in 2008, corresponds to 237.3 MIPS-years, very close to
our estimate of IMY (2008) = 238.8.
Moore’s Law (parameters a and c)
The original Moore’s Law refers to the number of transistors on an integrated circuit [Moo98]. Moore
estimated this number to double every two years‖. The number of MIPS of a CPU depends on the
number of transistors, but also on the clock speed. These two factors taken together increase the chip
performance by a factor of two every 18 months [Hou] (estimated by David House, an Intel executive).
For our sensitivity analysis, we will consider a 10% error in this estimate, i.e. a range between 16 and
20 months for a twofold performance increase. The value c = 1 is in line with past developments, but
we will show the impact of c = 0 below.
Budget (parameter b)
Our choice for the value of b is based on the budget development of the US, since it constitutes the
largest economic power worldwide. However, countries like China have a much higher economic
growth; some analysts expect China to overtake the US in the near future, doubling the US economic
power in 2030∗∗. This growth corresponds to a twicefold increase in economic power in 6 years.
Even though GDP of China is smaller than that of the US (about 40% in 2010) and the faster growth
is therefore on a smaller baseline, we will assume a range of 72–120 for the value of b.
Cryptanalytic progress (parameter r)
For more than two decades, cryptanalytic progress has improved the efficiency of the fastest attack
algorithm by a factor of two every 30 months. While every individual attack algorithm has a lower
bound for its complexity (see, for example, [BTP08, FS09, NCBBa]), many new attacks have been
developed which improved the previous bounds. As in the case of Moore’s Law, it is unclear whether
generic attack algorithms have a lower bound for their complexity that cannot be improved, thereby
slowing down cryptanalytic progress, or whether new cryptanalytic tools will increase the progress.
We will therefore consider a larger range for r, from 20 to 40 months.
¶www.keylength.com, ECRYPT II recommendations
‖See http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw/ or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moore’s_law
∗∗J. Lin, World Bank’s chief economist, on March 23rd, 2011
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Our Expected Impact
Parameter value range Absolute Percent
a 18 16–20 5.7 4.3%
b 120 72–120 4.5 3.5%
c 1 0/1 6.8 5.2%
r 30 20–40 8.4 6.4%
Table 5.2.: Impact of different input values to our model. Impact is the absolute and percent change
in the required security level for the year 2050. For example, ranging parameter a from 16
to 20 changes the security level between 126.4 and 136.7 bit, an absolute change of 5.7 bit
and a relative change of 4.3.
It can be seen from Table 5.2 that even very pessimistic assumptions (from an user’s point of
view) do not lead to dramatic changes in the required security level. For example, assuming the most
pessimistic value for all four parameters above raises the required security until at least 2050 from 131
to 149 bit, an increase of 18.6 bits or 14.2%. Table 5.4 (page 75) applies the optimistic and pessimistic
assumptions described above and shows optimal parameters for selected years.
5.3. Parameters selection
Our methodology
The problem of estimating secure parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem for security until at least
a given year consists in obtaining, for the security level S calculated in (5.3), a set of parameters that
achieves this security level and provides the smallest key size among all other such sets. To solve this
problem, we use the following methodology:
1. Based on simplified theoretical arguments we show that there exists an optimal information rate
R∗ = k/n with R∗ ≈ 0.8 such that for a given key size the maximum of security is achieved at
this rate.
2. We show how an instance attaining maximum security for a given key size can be used to solve
the problem of finding the optimal key size for a given security level.
3. We present an algorithm that we use to find optimal instances that have a rate of ≈ 0.74, corre-
sponding to the arguments from 1.
As pointed out in [Sen02], the complexity of the ISD-algorithms is roughly estimated by
C(n,R) = p(n)2−t(n,R) log2(1−R), (5.5)
where p(n) is some polynomial in n and t(n,R) the error-correcting capability. For the classical ISD
the degree of p is 3 and it gets lower for improvements. In the case of a t-error correcting Goppa code
of length n and dimension k = n− tdlog2 ne, the above formula becomes
CG(n,R) = p(n)2(c(R)n/ log2 n)(1+o(1)), (5.6)
where c(R) = −(1−R) log2(1−R) is the complexity coefficient. In [Sen02] it is also mentioned
that, neglecting p(n) and concentrating only on the exponential part, the following can be shown: for
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a given code length n, the highest complexity is achieved at an information rate of 1− e−1 ≈ 0.63.
Although we will compute our table using the lower bounds from [FS09], we would first like to
provide some theoretical evidence that the optimal rate exists also for the problem of the smallest
key size. Considering that the numerous improvements of the ISD enhance only the polynomial part
significantly, the reasoning appears to be sound. In the following lemma we simplify CG(n,R) to
CG(n,R) = 2(c(R)n/ log2 n)(1+o(1)), (5.7)
similarly to [Sen02].
Lemma 5.3.1. Given the key size K, the maximum complexity of an ISD-like algorithm as per (5.7) is
achieved at an information rate R∗ ≈ 0.8.
Proof. First, from the formula K =R(1−R)n2 we have that n=√K/(R(1−R)). Now if we substitute
this expression in (5.7) we obtain
CG(K,R) = 2
(
cK(R)
√
K/ log2
√
K
R(1−R)
)
(1+o(1))
,
where cK(R) = − log2(1−R)
√
1−R
R . So in order to maximize CG(K,R) for a given K we need to
maximize the term cK(R)
√
K/ log2
√
K
R(1−R) for K. Fixing K and taking a derivative we have the
following equation for obtaining the point of maximum:
c′K(R)
Ks
log2
Ks√
(1−R)R
+cK(R)
Ks(1−2R) ln2
2R(1−R) log22 Ks√(1−R)R
= 0,
where Ks =
√
K. This simplifies to
c′K(R)+ cK(R)
(1−2R) ln2
2R(1−R) log2 Ks√(1−R)R
= 0. (5.8)
Consider now the equation
c′K(R) = 0. (5.9)
The solution of this equation is a root of the equation
ln(1−R)
R
=−2
and numerically this root is R∗ ≈ 0.8. This shows that the function cK(R) is bounded: 0 < cK(R) <
cK(R∗). Now considering that for K, and thus for Ks, large enough the second summand of (5.8) is
negligible, we are left with the equation (5.9). The root of this equation is R∗.
Now let us show that having the fact that the maximum complexity for the given key size is attained
at some R∗, the minimum key size for the given security level is achieved for a code with the same
rate R∗.
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Proposition 5.3.1. Let the security level S∗ be given. Let C(K,R) be the complexity of a decoding
algorithm A for a code with the key size K and rate R. We impose the following formal assumptions
on C(K,R):
(a) C(K,R) is continuous on ]0,∞[×[0,1].
(b) C is unbounded in K for all R:
∀R ∈]0,1[: C(K,R)→ ∞,K→ ∞.
(c) C is increasing in K:
∀K2 > K1 > 0 ∀R ∈]0,1[: C(K1,R)<C(K2,R).
Further, assume that for given K the maximum complexity of A is achieved at R∗:
(d) ∀K > 0 ∀R 6= R∗ : C∗(K) :=C(K,R∗)>C(K,R).
Then the McEliece cryptosystem that satisfies the security level S∗ w.r.t A with the smallest possible
key size has an underlying Goppa code of rate R∗.
Proof. Due to (a) the function C∗(K) is continuous and due to (c) is strictly increasing. Now because
of (b) there exists a solution to C∗(K) = S∗. And because of the above mentioned properties of C∗ this
solution is unique: C∗(K∗) = S∗. Finally, the claim of the proposition follows from S∗ =C(K∗,R∗)>
C(K∗,R) ∀R 6= R∗.
Remark 5.3.1. Conditions (a)–(c) are natural for any complexity function of a decoding algorithm.
The property (d) is true at least for ISD-like algorithms as we have seen in Lemma 5.3.1.
So now we may expect the following to happen in our table. Although we use more advanced
lower bounds from [FS09] we still expect that for given K the maximum security will be achieved at
some R∗, the same for all K. As we have mentioned, this is due to the fact that the improvements of
the ISD algorithm do not seem to improve much on the exponential part. Moreover, because of the
same reason we expect this R∗ not to differ significantly from the value 0.8 predicted by Lemma 5.3.1.
Having this, we then use Proposition 5.3.1 to construct an algorithm that with arbitrary precision finds
an instance with the smallest key possible that achieves the given security level S. This algorithm is
depicted below (see Algorithm 5). In this algorithm, the value of S is calculated via the inequality
(5.4), the interval [Rstart ,Rend ] is chosen large enough and contains 0.8: we take an information rate
which ranges from Rstart = 0.6 to Rend = 0.85. All other parameters are chosen so that it is feasible
to complete the algorithm in a reasonable time. For the key size, we set Kup = 200 kB as an upper
bound and use the step size Kstep = 1 kB. Moreover, we use the lower bound formula from [FS09] as
a function C.
Proposed Parameters
Our results are presented in Table 5.3 which shows the following information:
• Year: the year until which data security is required. Historic data is given mainly to allow
comparison with other sources.
• Symmetric key size: the symmetric key size required to ensure data security, calculated in
accordance with Lenstra and Verheul’s approach.
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Algorithm 5 Search(S,C,Kstep,Kup,Rstep,Rstart ,Rend)
Input:
- Security level S
- Complexity function C(n,R) satisfying (a)− (d) of Proposition 5.3.1
- Step for the key size search Kstep
- Search upper bound for the key size Kup
- Step for the rate search Rstep
- Rate search interval bounds Rstart ,Rend
Output: nout and Rout such that
- The key size is the smallest possible up to steps Kstep and Rstep
for K = Kstep to Kup do
for R = Rstart to Rend do
n←
√
K
R(1−R)
if C(n,R)≥ S then
return n and R
end if
R← R+Rstep
end for
end for
• Lower bound for log2(S(n,k, t)): the log2 of the minimum number of binary operations (re-
quired to break a McEliece cryptosystem) that are expected still to be infeasible in the respective
year.
• The last two columns are a translation of the required symmetric key size into parameters rele-
vant in practice, i.e. the number of MIPS years that render a cryptosystem infeasible to break,
and the corresponding number of years on a modern Quad core CPU.
5.4. Conclusion and Open Problems
In this work we have addressed the problem of selecting optimal parameters for the McEliece cryp-
tosystem based on binary Goppa codes. This problem was to find instances of the McEliece cryptosys-
tem that are expected to remain secure at least until a given year and providing the smallest key sizes.
The computations were modelled using the Lenstra-Verheul framework which is based on Moore’s
Law and other assumptions about future developments. For this problem, we have presented detailed
parameter recommendations. This allows (potential) users of the McEliece cryptosystem to optimize
the parameter choice, thereby improving the applicability of code-based cryptography. We have also
shown the fact that all such optimal instances have information rate close to 0.74.
As a next step, we suggest a comprehensive analysis of concrete application scenarios. As we have
illustrated above, in these scenarios constraints, as well as the trade-offs between the code properties,
strongly depend on the details of the application, e.g. available bandwidth, acceptable response times,
or (typical) message size. This analysis would provide further insights into the current strengths and
limitations of code-based cryptography, thereby also suggesting new research focuses for the future.
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Table 5.3.: Proposed parameters for the McEliece cryptosystem – optimized for public key size
Sym- Lower McEliece para- Corresponding
metric bound for meters (n,k, t) and IMY(y) number of
Year Key Size log2 S(n,k, t) public key size (kB) (MIPS-years) years
a
2011 79 85 (1652, 1203, 42) 66 2.47 ·1012 5.61 ·107
2012 80 87 (1687, 1226, 43) 69 4.19 ·1012 9.52 ·107
2013 80 88 (1702, 1219, 45) 72 7.14 ·1012 1.62 ·108
2014 81 89 (1770, 1306, 43) 74 1.21 ·1013 2.75 ·108
2015 82 90 (1823, 1368, 42) 76 2.07 ·1013 4.70 ·108
2016 83 91 (1833, 1356, 44) 79 3.51 ·1013 7.98 ·108
2017 83 92 (1845, 1356, 45) 81 5.98 ·1013 1.36 ·109
2018 84 93 (1877, 1387, 45) 83 1.02 ·1014 2.32 ·109
2019 85 95 (1951, 1481, 43) 85 1.73 ·1014 3.93 ·109
2020 86 96 (1955, 1463, 45) 88 2.94 ·1014 6.68 ·109
2021 86 97 (1983, 1479, 46) 91 5.01 ·1014 1.14 ·1010
2022 87 98 (2013, 1508, 46) 93 8.52 ·1014 1.94 ·1010
2023 88 99 (2018, 1491, 48) 96 1.45 ·1015 3.30 ·1010
2024 89 101 (2104, 1596, 46) 99 2.47 ·1015 5.61 ·1010
2025 89 102 (2106, 1576, 48) 102 4.20 ·1015 9.55 ·1010
2026 90 103 (2135, 1604, 48) 104 7.14 ·1015 1.62 ·1011
2027 91 104 (2157, 1614, 49) 107 1.21 ·1016 2.75 ·1011
2028 92 105 (2198, 1654, 49) 110 2.07 ·1016 4.70 ·1011
2029 93 106 (2220, 1664, 50) 113 3.52 ·1016 8.00 ·1011
2030 93 108 (2241, 1673, 51) 116 5.98 ·1016 1.36 ·1012
2032 95 110 (2344, 1784, 50) 122 1.73 ·1017 3.93 ·1012
2034 96 112 (2440, 1877, 50) 129 5.01 ·1017 1.14 ·1013
2036 98 115 (2496, 1920, 51) 135 1.45 ·1018 3.30 ·1013
2038 99 117 (2440, 1776, 59) 144 4.20 ·1018 9.55 ·1013
2040 101 119 (2521, 1854, 59) 151 1.22 ·1019 2.77 ·1014
2042 103 122 (2623, 1964, 58) 158 3.52 ·1019 8.00 ·1014
2044 104 124 (2662, 1979, 60) 165 1.02 ·1020 2.32 ·1015
2046 106 126 (2691, 1973, 63) 173 2.95 ·1020 6.70 ·1015
2048 107 129 (2798, 2088, 62) 181 8.53 ·1020 1.94 ·1016
2050 109 131 (2804, 2048, 66) 189 2.47 ·1021 5.61 ·1016
aon a 2.4 GHz Intel Core 2 Quad Q6600
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5.4. Conclusion and Open Problems
Table 5.4.: Comparison of parameters using optimistic versus pessimistic assumptions (from a users
point of view) for selected years.
Optimistic scenario Pessimistic scenario
Lower McEliece para- Lower McEliece para-
bound for meters (n,k, t) and bound for meters (n,k, t) and
Year log2 S(n,k, t) public key size (kB) log2 S(n,k, t) public key size (kB)
2020 95 (1902, 1390, 47) 87 98 (2047, 1541, 46) 95
2030 105 (2220, 1664, 50) 113 112 (2396, 1801, 53) 131
2040 142 (2453, 1811, 57) 116 126 (2730, 2045, 60) 171
2050 127 (2732, 2024, 62) 175 139 (3108, 2342, 66) 219
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